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RETHINKING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Nicole Hallettt

Prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement stands at a crossroads. It
was the centerpiece of Obama's immigration policy after efforts to pass
comprehensive immigration reform failed. Under the Trump administration, it was
declared all but dead, replaced by an ethos of maximum enforcement. Biden has
promised a return to the status quo ante, but the record of using prosecutorial
discretion to accomplish humanitarian goals in immigration enforcement under
Obama was, at best, mixed. Moreover, it is unclear whether Biden can depend on
the availability of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), Obama's signature prosecutorial discretion program. Although the
Supreme Court struck down the Trump administration's attempt to end DACA, it
did so without deciding whether the program was lawful. Future legal challenges
may leave the executive branch with even fewer options for reforming the
immigration system without Congressional action. The Biden administration will
need to rethink how to use prosecutorial discretion to accomplish its immigration
policy goals.
This Article argues that the Obama administration's experience revealed the
clear shortcomings of using prosecutorial discretion in lieu of legislative reform to
mitigate the harshest consequences of the current immigration system. Though it
has, in some circumstances, led to positive individual outcomes, it has failed to
provide the kind of systemic reliefthat was promised, both because of the limitations
of prosecutorial discretion in general, and because of special characteristics of the
immigration system that make it particularly ill-suitedfor the widespread use of
discretion to accomplish humanitarian goals. Rather than simply reinstating
Obama-era discretion policies, future administrations must implement reforms to

t Associate Clinical Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, Director of the
Immigrants' Rights Clinic. The author would like to thank Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Hiroshi
Motomura, Guyora Binder, Anthony O'Rourke, and the participants of the AALS New Voices in
Immigration Law: Works in Progress Panel and the University at Buffalo School of Law faculty
workshop for their feedback on drafts of this article.
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the immigration system that would allow prosecutorial discretion to work better to
advance the stated goal of these policies-injecting some humanity into an otherwise
inhumane system.
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INTRODUCTION

Two weeks after President Trump took office, Guadalupe Garcia
de Rayos was deported.' She had crossed the U.S.-Mexico border
illegally at fourteen and had lived in the United States for more than
two decades.2 In 2008, she was arrested by immigration authorities and
ordered deported by an immigration judge.3 But Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not move to deport her. Instead,
Garcia de Rayos had regular check-ins with ICE. It was at one of these
check-ins shortly after Trump's inauguration that she was arrested and
deported to Mexico, one of the first people deported under the Trump
administration's policy of designating every undocumented immigrant
a priority for deportation. She left behind her two U.S.-citizen children
and the country she had called home for more than half her life.4
The U.S. immigration system is broken; almost everyone on all
sides of the issue agrees. 5 And yet, we are no closer to comprehensive
immigration reform than we were in 2007 and 2013; the last two times
such efforts failed in Congress.6 Instead, the congressional impasse on
immigration has emboldened successive administrations to stretch
executive power to its limits in attempts to accomplish what Congress
either cannot or will not. The result is an immigration policy that swings
violently depending on the administration in office. Obama's generous
enforcement priorities and creation of programs such as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which allowed undocumented
immigrants brought to the United States as children to apply for
deferred action, is followed by Trump's "zero tolerance" at the border

1 Fernanda Santos, She Showed Up Yearly to Meet Immigration Agents. Now They've
Deported Her, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/phoenixguadalupe-garcia-de-rayos.html [https://perma.cc/QG4P-KVBB].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
s See Remarks on Immigration Reform, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 3 (May 16, 2019)
(President Trump detailing "broken asylum system" and "broken rules" for who can come to the
United States); Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1509 (Nov. 20,
2014) (President Obama declaring that "our immigration system is broken-and everybody
knows it").

6 Kevin R. Johnson, Lessons About the Future of Immigration Law from the Rise and Fall of
DACA, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343, 360 (2018) (detailing successive failures by Congress to pass
comprehensive immigration reform); RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42980, BRIEF
HISTORY OF COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 109TH AND 110TH
CONGRESSES TO INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 2-5 (2013).
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and a crackdown on sanctuary jurisdictions.7 In his first months in

office, Biden has changed course on immigration policy yet again,
implementing new priorities for deportation that decrease the number
of people that the federal government has prioritized for deportation.8

Meanwhile, Congress has abdicated its role in trying to fix the system,
instead delegating most of its power to the executive branch to decide
how to enforce the draconian immigration laws Congress has passed.9
Prosecutorial discretion-or the power of the executive to decide
when, how, and whether to enforce the law against particular
individuals or groups o-has always been a feature of the immigration
system and has been a predominant one since at least the 1990s.11 Like
in the criminal justice system, prosecutorial discretion is important
both in terms of allocating scarce resources and in mitigating unjust

outcomes. 12 But prosecutorial discretion as it is used today in
immigration enforcement goes beyond these twin objectives. It has
become a tool for a wholesale rewriting of immigration policy to suit
the objectives the current administration espouses. There are limits, of
course; both the Obama and Trump administrations' immigration
policies were subject to extensive legal challenges in the courts.13

7 SARAH PIERCE & ANDREW SELEE, IMMIGRATION UNDER TRUMP: A REVIEW OF POLICY
(2017),
MIGRATION POL'Y INST.
SINCE THE ELECTION,
IN THE YEAR

SHIFTS

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TrumpatOne-fmal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2QR-J34B] (detailing the shift in immigration policy under President
Trump).
8 Memorandum from Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, to All
ICE Emps. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/docib/news/releases/2021/021821_civilimmigration-enforcement-interim-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4FQ-AG9Y].
9 See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 464-65 (2009) (arguing that the complex regulatory scheme enacted by Congress, which
makes a large majority of non-citizens deportable, has the effect of delegating power to the
executive to decide enforcement priorities).
10 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010).
11 See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL

DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7 (2015); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012)
("A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials."); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, THE PRESIDENT'S DISCRETION, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT,

AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/thepresidentsdiscretionimmigrationenforcement_and_the_rule_oflaw_
final_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/56ZH-JHUU].
12 WADHIA, supra note 11, at 8; ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007).

13 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136
Ct. 2392 (2018).

S.

Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
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However, the breadth and scope of the laws governing deportation and
the heightened power that the executive branch enjoys in the area of
immigration has meant that successive administrations have been able
to use prosecutorial discretion to accomplish what they could not
legislatively.14
The record of using prosecutorial discretion to make immigration
policy has been mixed at best. It has provided temporary relief to
deserving individuals who otherwise would have been deported or
forced to live in the shadows, undoubtedly a positive result. On the
other hand, this widespread use of prosecutorial discretion has inflicted
severe costs. Criminal justice scholars have long recognized that
reliance on prosecutorial discretion almost inevitably leads to arbitrary,
biased, and unjust results.15 This is even more so in the immigration
context because the system has fewer constitutional safeguards and
because the immigration laws themselves are even more capacious and
open to interpretation. Moreover, certain features of immigration law,
such as the lack of a statute of limitations for most immigration
violations,16 the black-and-white consequences of committing an
immigration violation,17 and the lack of procedural protections for
immigrants in removal proceedings18 make the immigration system
uniquely unsuitable for extensive reliance on prosecutorial discretion.
While scholars such as Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Daniel
Kanstroom have previously written about the use of prosecutorial
discretion in the immigration context, their focus has been primarily on
understanding how it has operated and why it has become so
important.19 Less explored is how often these policies have failed to
fulfill their humanitarian objectives and how it has given rise to a whole
new problem-individuals like Guadalupe Garcia de Rayos and the
DACA recipients who remain in limbo indefinitely.

14 See Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV.
77, 96 (2017) (noting that the Immigration and Nationality Act "employs exceptionally broad
and ambiguous language"); Gerald L. Neuman, DiscretionaryDeportation,20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
611 (2006).
15 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 4-5.
16 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(b) ("Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this
chapter . . . is deportable.").
17 Id.
18 Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law's Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary
Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 118, 125-26 (2018).
19 WADHIA, supra note 11; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).
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Now is a particularly good time to rethink prosecutorial discretion
in immigration enforcement. In June 2020, the Supreme Court struck
down the Trump administration's rescission of DACA without

resolving fundamental questions about its legality.20 The Biden
administration has restored DACA to its status under the Obama
administration,21 but new legal challenges are looming.22 Although it is
difficult to read the Supreme Court tea leaves, the Regents decision
suggests the Court could find a DACA-like program unlawful in the
future.23 Moreover, the Trump administration's attempt to end DACA

has revealed just how vulnerable such programs are to revocation by
hostile administrations, leaving those affected by these policies in a
constant state of limbo.
This Article lays out how past discretion policies have failed and
how, given the design of the current immigration system, they were

destined to fail. It assumes that prosecutorial discretion will always be a
feature of any enforcement system, including the immigration system,

and, therefore, it explores ways to design future discretion polices to
accomplish the stated goals of such policies' proponents-injecting
humanity into an otherwise inhumane system. It does not assume either
that comprehensive immigration reform will happen or that it will not.
The author is skeptical that comprehensive immigration reform is on
the horizon, but such reforms would improve the system, even in the

absence of a legislative overhaul. However, it takes a critical eye towards
the decision by some immigration advocates and policymakers to invest
political capital into expanding prosecutorial discretion rather than on

pushing for legislative action. In the end, it concludes that the system
itself must change in order for prosecutorial discretion to work the way
it should. Implementing these reforms should be a priority of the Biden

administration, which takes over at a time when systematic reform of
immigration policy has never been more urgent.

20 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
21 Memorandum on Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1 (Jan. 20, 2021).
22 Sabrina Rodriguez, 'They Need to Move Quickly': A Texas DACA Case Could Force
Congress to Move on Immigration,POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/
[https://perma.cc/QND9news/2021/02/10/texas-daca-congress-biden-immigration-468199
ULCP].
23 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1910-15.
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SHORT PRIMER ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT

A.

Legal, Moral, and PracticalFoundationsof Prosecutorial
Enforcement

Prosecutorial discretion has been a feature of the executive
branch's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" since
the beginning of the Republic.24 Courts have largely taken for granted
the power of the executive to determine how to utilize its limited
enforcement resources, and have repeatedly held that "an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion."25 As the sheer number of criminal and civil laws has
exploded over the past century, the importance of prosecutorial
discretion has only increased.26 There is simply no way that the
government can fully enforce all of the criminal and civil offenses on
the books today; doing so would require dedicating vastly more
resources than are currently available for enforcement activities.27
These decisions are justified not only because the government has
limited resources, but also because justice requires the executive to have
such discretion.28 The legislatures that enact the laws cannot anticipate
how those laws will interact with the facts and circumstances of
individual cases. Even just laws, if enforced fully, will give rise to unjust
results, and thus, law enforcement must have discretion in deciding
how, when, and whether to enforce the laws in any particular case or
category of cases. Moreover, some individuals who could be justly
convicted of a crime or charged with a civil offense are nevertheless
worthy of leniency because of extenuating factors in their lives.29 Similar

24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5; Peter L. Markowitz, ProsecutorialDiscretion Power at Its
Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 497-98 (2017) (collecting Framers'
discussions on importance of prosecutorial discretion).
25 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to
decide whether to prosecute a case .... ").
26 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 13; Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.

853 (2012) (detailing civil penalties imposed by federal administrative agencies).
27 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 13.
28 Id. at 14; WADHIA, supra note 11, at 8.
29 WADHIA, supra note 11, at 8.
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to the pardon power, prosecutorial discretion gives the executive the
power to exercise mercy in appropriate circumstances.30
Today, it is well established that the government has the power to

decline prosecution in both individual cases, and to make policy
decisions regarding enforcement that apply to groups of individuals.31
For example, when states began to legalize marijuana use, the federal
government issued guidance that it would not enforce low-level
marijuana offenses in jurisdictions that had legalized marijuana as long
as those states implemented robust regulatory schemes to minimize
harmful effects of legalization.32 The Bush administration took similar
actions in the field of environmental regulation, declining to enforce
some provisions of the Clean Air Act.33

In the immigration context, decisions regarding when to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in individual cases has been equally
uncontroversial.34 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that immigration authorities
have discretion to "decline to institute proceedings, terminate

proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation" and
upheld a statute that stripped judicial review from courts reviewing
such decisions.35 Although the Obama administration's Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program was challenged in
the courts as both a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Take Care Clause,36 the administration's guidelines for which noncitizens would be priorities for deportation were not challenged and

30 Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justificationof Executive Clemency,
9 BUFF. CIUM. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2005).
31 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154, 155 (1871) (upholding President's
pardon of individuals for acts related to the Civil War).
32 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to All U.S. Att'ys
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4R3-XG7S] (providing "Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement").
33 Markowitz, supra note 24, at 491.
34 See, e.g., Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, Gen. Couns., U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., to Comm'r (July 15, 1976), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/
service-exercise-pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TW5-VHHJ] (issuing "Legal Opinion Regarding
Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion").
35 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
36 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). For a discussion of the constitutionality of DACA, see Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 759-60 (2014).
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were considered to be squarely within the government's discretionary
powers. 37
There are multiple ways that immigration officials can exercise
prosecutorial discretion. First, ICE can decline to initiate removal
proceedings for individuals with whom it comes in contact during its
enforcement activities.38 This type of prosecutorial discretion occurred
often during the Obama administration, when individuals would be
arrested, fingerprinted, questioned, and then released.39 Such discretion
occurs through both prioritization policies and through the decisions of
individual ICE officers.
Second, ICE can obtain a removal order from an immigration
court, but then decline to execute it, allowing the individual to stay
indefinitely. This is the type of prosecutorial discretion that Garcia de
Rayos had enjoyed before ICE deported her in February 2017. Almost a
million non-citizens remain in the United States after receiving a
removal order, and many of whom have the tacit or express permission
of ICE to do so.4 0
Third, ICE can decide not to engage in certain enforcement
activities. For instance, until recently, ICE had a policy not to engage in

37 See Texas, 809 F.3d at 166 ("Part of DAPA involves the Secretary's decision-at least
temporarily-not to enforce the immigration laws as to a class of what he deems to be lowpriority illegal aliens. But importantly, the states have not challenged the priority levels he has
established, and neither the preliminary injunction nor compliance with the APA requires the
Secretary to remove any alien or to alter his enforcement priorities.") (footnote omitted);
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter
Prioritization Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120_memo_
prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y3Q-5RVU] (instituting "Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants").
38 There used to be a related form of prosecutorial discretion wherein ICE would initiate
removal proceedings and then seek to have them administratively closed by the immigration
judge. This form of discretion was foreclosed by the Attorney General's decision in Castro-Tum,
27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), which held that immigration judges do not have the authority
to administratively close cases.
39 See, e.g., Nicole Hallett, The #Buffalo25 and the New Era of Immigration Enforcement, 21
CUNY L. REV. 1, 9 (2017); Prioritization Memo, supra note 37.
40 Declining Deportations and Increasing Criminal Alien Releases-The Lawless Immigration
Policies of the Obama Administration: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigr. and the Nat'l Int. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016). ICE can place non-citizens with final orders of
removal on "order[s] of supervision," which give them the ability to apply for work authorization
and require them to check-in periodically with ICE. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18) (2021).
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civil immigration enforcement at schools, courthouses, and hospitals.41
Similarly, the Obama administration moved away from large workplace

raids and instead focused workplace enforcement on employer
violations.42
Fourth, ICE can affirmatively grant what is called "deferred

action," which grants an individual quasi-legal status and work
authorization for one- or two-year increments.43 Deferred action can be
granted in individual cases, or it can be granted as part of a program
such as DACA.44 Importantly, prosecutorial discretion does not and
cannot lead to lawful or permanent status in the United States or to U.S.
citizenship.45 It simply allows the non-citizen in question to remain
temporarily in the United States and, in some circumstances, to work
legally.46 Although there are differences between these types of

prosecutorial discretion, in terms of both scope and effect, they share a
common feature-they all involve a decision by an executive branch
official not to fully enforce the law in a particular case.
Prosecutorial discretion has been a feature of immigration
enforcement since the early days of restricted immigration in the late

1880s. However, two factors have led the immigration system to become
increasingly dependent on widespread use of prosecutorial discretion

to function. First, the number of non-citizens subject to the
immigration laws has grown, necessitating the need to allocate

enforcement resources efficiently. After falling slightly in the middle of

41 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Field Off. Dirs. et
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf
24,
2011),
(Oct.
al.
[https://perma.cc/PCH9-N979] (providing guidance for "Enforcement Actions at or Focused on
Sensitive Locations").
42 Hallett, supra note 39, at 4-5.

43 WADHIA, supra note 11.
44 Deferred Action Basics, NAT'L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://immigrationforum.org/article/
deferred-action-basics [https://perma.cc/2PZJ-SFAQ]. Daniel Kanstroom has identified two other
types of discretion used by the immigration agencies: relief-based discretion (which Kanstroom
calls "ultimate discretion"), where discretion is written into the. eligibility requirements for
various forms of relief, and interpretive discretion, where the executive exercises its discretion in
how it interprets ambiguous statutes and regulations. KANSTROOM, supra note 19, at 233-40.
Both forms of discretion clearly play a role in the administration of the immigration laws, though
neither are within the scope of this Article.
45 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 147-48 (5th Cir. 2015) ("[A]lthough [d]eferred action
does not confer any form of legal status in this country, much less citizenship[,] it [does] mean[
] that, for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be lawfully present in the United
States.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and modifications in original), affd by
an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
46 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2021).
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the twentieth century, the number of non-citizens residing in the
United States has increased, from slightly less than 10 million in the
mid-1960s to almost 45 million today.47
Perhaps more importantly, the number of undocumented
immigrants has increased from roughly 3.5 million in 1990 to 10.7
million in 2016, tripling the number of non-citizens who are deportable
by their mere presence in the United States.48 Although resources spent
on immigration enforcement have also increased,49 there is widespread
recognition that the government can only prosecute a small percentage
of immigration violators each year. There are currently 1.3 million (and
growing) backlogged removal cases in immigration courts waiting to be
adjudicated.50 More arrests would simply increase the queue, not lead
to more deportations, without a massive influx of funds into the
immigration system.51
In addition, Congress has passed increasingly harsh immigration
laws, which have made a large percentage of non-citizens deportable.52
This trend began in the 1980s, roughly at the same time as skyrocketing
crime rates led to the enactment of draconian criminal laws.53 The AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 created a new category of deportability for noncitizens convicted of "aggravated felonies," which at that point were

47 Jeanne Batalova, Brittany Blizzard & Jessica Bolter, Frequently Requested Statistics on
Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-andimmigration-united-states [https://perma.cc/8QSZ-BRLS].
48 Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest Level
in a Decade, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2018/11/27/u-s[https://perma.cc/4UUDunauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade
M5SF}.
49 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE COST OF IMMIGRATION

ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/the-cost-of(2020),
SECURITY
immigration-enforcement-and-border-security [https://perma.cc/PQ58-5C4L].
50 Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court backlog [https://perma.cc/6HCY-77CF].
51 The Trump administration increased the number of immigration judges, but not nearly
enough to clear the backlog. See Press Release, Dep't of Just., Executive Office for Immigration
Review Announces Investiture of 20 New Immigration Judges, Resulting in a 70 Percent
Expansion of the Immigration Judge Corps Since 2017 (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-announces-investiture-20-new-immigrationjudges-resulting [https://perma.cc/9BT4-ZN8G].
52 KANSTROOM, supra note 19, at 226-28.
53 MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, CRIME TRENDS: 1990-2016

(2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/crime-trends-1990-2016
[https://perma.cc/D4NQ-C7F2].
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limited to crimes such as murder and serious drug trafficking offenses.54
By 1996, Congress had expanded the definition of aggravated felony to
include many serious and non-serious crimes, including in some
circumstances simple assault and shoplifting.55
At the same time, Congress severely limited the forms of relief that

were available to non-citizens who had been convicted of a crime or
who were.undocumented. What had once been quite a broad form of
relief called "suspension of deportation" became what is now called
"cancellation of removal."56 Unless a non-citizen fears persecution or
other harm in their home country or can gain status through a U.S.
citizen relative, cancellation of removal is the main form of relief
available to most non-citizens in removal proceedings. And most noncitizens are not eligible or will not meet the exacting requirements.

Non-citizens convicted of an aggravated felony are now categorically
barred from eligibility for cancellation of removal.57 Other criminal

convictions do not constitute an absolute bar, but often result in a
denial.58 Moreover, undocumented immigrants-in addition to
showing good moral character-must show that their deportation

would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent, or child,S9 a standard that
courts have interpreted to preclude relief in all but the most
extraordinary cases. 60
The result is what then-General Counsel of the Immigration and
Nationality Service David Martin called a "perfect storm"-the vast

majority of non-citizens today are or could be deportable, either
because of criminal conduct or because of status-related violations, and
if they are placed into removal proceedings, most will have no available

54 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
55 See KANSTROOM, supra note 19, at 227-28 (describing development of law towards
"criminal aliens"); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA or
IIRAIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 546, 627-28; Andrew David Kennedy,
Note, Expedited Injustice: The Problems Regarding the Current Law of Expedited Removal of
Aggravated Felons, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1847 (2007) (detailing history of aggravated felony
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1254, repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
57 § 1229b(a)(3).
58 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 336 (B.I.A. 2007) (explaining crime need not be an
aggravated felony to be a particularly serious crime barring an individual from asylum).
59 § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
60 See, e.g., Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 320 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding that the
mother of two U.S. citizen children who had no social support in Mexico and who would be
separated from the children's father had not shown requisite hardship).
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form of relief.61 As Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have explained,
the current structure of the immigration system-wherein many noncitizens are deportable but few will ever be deported because of resource
constraints-gives the executive branch enormous power over who will
be deported from the country. 62 As Congress has asserted itself in the
immigration field with progressively harsher amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the power to make the actual
decisions about who will be able to stay and who will be deported has
been transferred almost exclusively to the executive.
In addition, because the immigration laws have become so
unforgiving, prosecutorial discretion has become necessary to avoid
cruel outcomes. Indeed, there is some evidence that Congress itself
assumed that the immigration agencies would use prosecutorial
discretion to moderate the harshest consequences of the 1996 laws. As
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has written,63 a few years after the passage of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, members of Congress-including a few who sponsored the 1996
law-wrote to the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to urge it
to issue guidelines on the use of prosecutorial discretion because
"[t]here has been widespread agreement that some deportations were
unfair and resulted in unjustifiable hardship."64 Though the INS pushed
back on this notion, arguing in a letter that "prosecutorial discretion
guidelines-without carefully drafted substantive amendments to the
INA-remain an inadequate tool to alleviate the excessively harsh
consequences of the 1996 amendments in truly exceptional cases,"65
Congress failed to revisit the law.
Similarly, all efforts to pass the DREAM Act, which would have
protected undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as
children,66 died as soon as President Obama announced the DACA

61 Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez, The Limits of Discretion: Challenges and Dilemmas
of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Enforcement, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 666, 671 (2014).
62 See supra note 9, at 513-14.
63 See WADHIA, supra note 11, at 22-23.
64 Letter from Members of Congress to Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just. & Doris M.
Meissner, Comm'r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
foia/prosecutorial-discretion/991104congress-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/V723-CZ53].
65 Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Barney Frank, U.S. House of
19, 2000), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ins-use-of-prosecutorial(Jan.
Representatives
discretioni-iiraira [https://perma.cc/Y4XJ-UYZ7].
66 DREAM Act, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).
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program in 2012.67 After President Trump cancelled the program in
September 2017, renewed efforts were made to pass the DREAM Act

through Congress, but efforts were again shelved after courts enjoined
the program's cancellation.68 Implicit in these decisions is the belief that
legislative reform was unnecessary because DACA-essentially a large
prosecutorial discretion program-made it unnecessary. DACA
allowed Congress to shirk its responsibilities a little longer.
Thus, at various points Congress has forged ahead with strict
immigration overhauls and declined to amend those policies once the
harsh consequences became clear. The executive branch is both
required to utilize prosecutorial discretion because of resource demands
and is expected to by a Congress that has abdicated its authority to fix
the problems that it has created through its past legislative actions.
Moreover, this practice of using prosecutorial discretion has increased
over time as the number of potentially deportable non-citizens has gone
from a few individuals to a large percentage of the non-citizens

currently in the United States. It has now become the dominant form of
humanitarian relief available to the majority of deportable non-citizens.
B.

ProsecutorialDiscretionPoliciesfrom the 1970s to Present

The progression of the executive's prosecutorial discretion policies
and guidelines track these developments in the immigration system. In
the 1970s, the numbers of deportations were fairly low-just over
17,000

in

1973, for

example69-and

the

government's

use

of

prosecutorial discretion was much opaquer than it is today. Prior to
1975, INS could put individuals into "non-priority" status, whereby
certain deportable non-citizens were declared not to be a priority for

67 After being introduced in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the DREAM Act was not reintroduced
until after Trump rescinded DACA in 2017. DREAM Act of 2009, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009);
DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong.
(2011); Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115th Cong. (2017).
68 Michael D. Shear & Adam Liptak, It's Now the Supreme Court's Turn to Try to Resolve the
Fate of the Dreamers, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/
politics/supreme-court-daca-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/Y5NL-KPB9].
69 OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 103 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%202014%
20Yearbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW7N-VVHE].
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deportation. 70 The program operated largely in secret, with INS officials
going so far as to deny its existence.71
The government finally released information about the program in
response to litigation brought by the attorney for John Lennon, who,
they alleged, had been improperly denied "non-priority" status because
of political reasons. 72 The purpose of the policy was "to avoid a result
which on humanitarian grounds would be unconscionable."73 The
Operations Instructions, in which the program was memorialized,
listed five factors for the INS to consider when deciding whether to
grant "non-priority" status: "(1) advanced or tender age, (2) long
residence in the United States, (3) physical or mental condition
requiring care . .. in the United States, (4) family situation [that would
be affected by expulsion], and (5) "criminal, immoral, or subversive
activities or affiliations-recent conduct."74
Lennon's attorney, Leon Wildes, analyzed records of the 1,843
non-priority decisions issued in 1974 that he had obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act and found that individuals of all types had
been granted "non-priority" status:
Nonpriority has been granted to aliens who have committed serious
crimes involving moral turpitude, drug convictions, fraud, or
prostitution. Moreover, nonpriority has been given to Communists,
the insane, the feebleminded, and the medically infirm. In sum,
nonpriority has been granted to those who have violated almost any
7
provision of the Act. 5
Decisions were made based on humanitarian factors, regardless of
the grounds of deportability.76
"Non-priority" status eventually became known as deferred action
with the Operations Instructions becoming the Standard Operating

70 Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Programof the Immigrationand NaturalizationService Goes
Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976).
71 Id. at 42-43.
72 In the foreword to Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia's book Beyond Deportation, Leon Wildes
explains that the INS Commissioner had received a letter from Senator Strom Thurmond that
said that Lennon's presence in the United States would be detrimental to Nixon's reelection plans
and that this letter led the INS to institute deportation proceedings against Lennon and Yoko
Ono. WADHIA, supra note 11, at ix-xi.
73 Wildes, supra note 70, at 50.
74 Leon Wildes, The OperationsInstructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides or
BindingRules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 100, 100 n.5 (1979).
75 Wildes, supra note 70, at 51.
76 Id. at 53.
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Procedures in 1996.77 Though the standards remained functionally
similar,78 in practice, many fewer non-citizens with criminal
convictions, particularly drug convictions, were granted deferred action
after the passage of IIRIRA and the modern dawn of draconian
immigration laws.79 In other words, as legal changes increased the

importance of prosecutorial discretion, the actual use of discretion
declined.
In the waning days of the Clinton administration, INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a memo reiterating that
prosecutorial discretion remained an important tool and that "[s]ervice

officers are not only authorized by law but expected to exercise
discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement
process."80 Meissner's memo sets forth an expanded list of factors to be
considered, including immigration status (in particular whether a noncitizen is a lawful permanent resident), length of residence in the United

States, criminal history, humanitarian concerns, past immigration
violations, likelihood of ultimately removing the individual, whether
the individual is eligible for relief, current or past cooperation with law
enforcement, honorable U.S. military service, community attention on

the case, and resource constraints.81 It also contained a list of factors
that were not to be considered, including an individual's race, political
opinion, or religion, an individual officer's personal feelings regarding

the individual, and the effect on the officer's own career or professional
advancement.82
Throughout the early 2000s and after the transfer of immigration
enforcement from the Department of Justice to the newly created

77 Wadhia, supra note 10, at 251.
78 Id.
79 Leon Wildes, The DeferredAction Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 838
(2004) ("The major change is that those with criminal or drug charges and convictions are no
longer being granted deferred action status at the rate they were once granted this status.").
. 80 Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., to
Reg'l Dirs. et al. 1 (Nov. 17; 2000), http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2NA-NRWU].
81 Id. at 7-8. The memo also identifies certain characteristics that should trigger a review of
whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate in a particular case, including
lawful permanent residents, juveniles, the elderly, adopted children of U.S. citizens, U.S. military
veterans, and non-citizens who have been physically present for more than ten years. Id. at 11.
82 Id. at 9.
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS),83 prosecutorial discretion
remained an important feature of the immigration system. Successive
memoranda from DHS officials laid out specific situations in which
prosecutorial discretion should be exercised, while reaffirming the right
of immigration officers to make decisions regarding whether to pursue
removal in particular cases. 84 Although the process was more
transparent than it had been before the 1970s-at least the memos that
governed prosecutorial discretion were made public-it remained
difficult to understand exactly how these decisions were made. The
guidelines were applied unevenly and inconsistently. The 1996 laws and
the spike in illegal border crossings-which peaked at 1.6 million a year
in 200085-put enormous strain on the immigration system. But rather
than utilizing prosecutorial discretion more broadly, the backlog in the
immigration courts began to grow, and many non-citizens with
removal orders were not removed, not because a decision was made to
decline to execute the removal order, but simply because there were not
enough planes to put people on.
The Obama administration came into office with grand hopes of
comprehensive immigration reform.86 But after repeated attempts to get
Republicans to the bargaining table,87 Obama began to use his executive
authority to reform the immigration system administratively. Obama
first took a conservative approach, utilizing the same kinds of
memoranda on prosecutorial discretion that had been favored by his
predecessors. In 2011, ICE Director John Morton issued a memo listing
no fewer than thirty-one factors for officers to consider when deciding
whether to exercise discretion.88 Still, many non-citizens who did not

83 Who Joined DHS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs
[https://perma.cc/TR5S-9QM5].
84 Wadhia, supra note 10, at 259-60 (collecting discretion memos from 2000 to 2008).
85 More U.S. BorderApprehensions of Non-Mexicans Than Mexican in 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/28/what-we-know-aboutillegal-immigration-from-mexico/ft_18-12-03_mexicoillegalimmigrationapprehensions__final

[https://perma.cc/KQP5-EM3U].
86 See Andrew Kaczynski, In 2008, Obama PromisedImmigration Reform in FirstYear of First
Term, YouTUBE (Apr. 18, 2012), https://youtu.be/yUWJHmRjJy0 [https://perma.cc/V6WAQR6J]; Josh Hicks, Obama's Failed Promise of a First-Year Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-failedpromise-of-a-first-year-immigration-overhaul/2012/09/25/06997958-0721-11e2-a1Ocfa5a255a9258_blog.html [https://perma.cc/KZ87-ZG9U].
87 Hicks, supra note 86.
88 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, to All Field Off.
Dirs. et al. 4-5 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6DN-CK87].
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meet the enforcement priorities were being removed despite the
guidance.89
After the failure of the DREAM Act in 2010,90 Obama decided to

take further action. In 2012, he announced DACA, which protected
undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children
from deportation and gave them the opportunity to apply for work
authorization, which in turn made them eligible for other benefits.91
Though the program was not unprecedented-past presidents had
issued policies to protect particular categories of people from

deportation92-it was unprecedented in its scope. It was estimated that
1.8 million people might be eligible for the program; approximately
800,000 ended up applying and being granted deferred action for

renewable two-year periods.93
After the failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 2013,
the Obama administration announced DAPA and an expanded DACA

program. DAPA would have allowed undocumented immigrants who
met certain conditions and who had at least one U.S. citizen child to
apply for deferred action.94 The expanded DACA program removed
several of the requirements in the original program, such as the upper
age limit.95 Altogether, approximately five million undocumented

immigrants would have been eligible for relief from deportation under
these programs. 96 Several states went to court to block DAPA and

89 Ahilan Arulanantham, The President's Relief Program as a Response to Insurrection,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/the-presidentsrelief-program-as.html [https://perma.cc/3AEE-8ENM].
90 Brian Montopoli, DREAM Act Dies in Senate, CBS NEWS (Dec. 18, 2010, 2:48 PM),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dream-act-dies-in-the-senate-18-12-2010
42YP-XNSP].
91 Remarks by the President on Immigration and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS
800 (June 15, 2012).
92 Prioritizing and Deferring Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United
States, 38 Op. O.L.C. 39, 57-61 (2014) (collecting examples).
93 Alan Gomez, Who Are the DACA DREAMers and How Many Are Here?, USA TODAY (Feb.
13, 2018, 4:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/13/who-dacadreamers-and-how-many-here/333045002 [https://perma.cc/7N9X-YHT8].
94 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Le6n
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv. et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson
Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memodeferredaction_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KB4K-J558].
95 Id. at 3.
&

96 RANDY CAPPS, HEATHER KOBALL, JAMES D. BACHMEIER, ARIEL G. RUIZ SoTo, JIE ZONG
JULIA GELATT, DEFERRED ACTION FOR UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT PARENTS: ANALYSIS OF
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expanded DACA.97 After a district court in Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals enjoined the programs,98 the injunction was upheld
by an equally divided Supreme Court.99 The programs never went into
effect.100
At the same time, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
Johnson issued a memorandum with new civil immigration
enforcement priorities that rescinded most previous memos on
prosecutorial discretion.I01 Unlike previous memos that listed factors
that officers were instructed to consider when determining whether to
exercise discretion, the Johnson Memo listed three clear priority
categories for removals, and designated a very large group of individuals
who would not be a priority absent an additional determination by
immigration officials.102
Priority 1 listed five categories of non-citizens who were
considered threats to national security, border security, and public
safety, including non-citizens engaged in terrorism, those apprehended
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, and non-citizens convicted of
aggravated felonies.103 Individuals in the first priority were to be
removed unless "there are compelling and exceptional factors that
clearly indicate the alien is not a threat to national security, border
security, or public safety and should not therefore be an enforcement
priority."104
Priority 2 was "misdemeanants and new immigration violators,"
including non-citizens convicted of three or more misdemeanors, a
significant misdemeanor, or who had illegally reentered the country

DAPA'S

POTENTIAL

EFFECTS

ON

FAMILIES

AND

CHILDREN

3-4

(2016),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA-ProfileFINALWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LE5-GRTS].
97 David Montgomery & Julia Preston, 17 States Suing on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/us/executive-action-on-immigration-promptstexas-to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/3C5X-S37V.
98 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), affd by an equally divided Court, 136
S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
99 Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271.
100 Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K.
McAleenan, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/

news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-action-parents-americans-and-lawful
[https://perma.cc/E845-4H8C].

101 Prioritization Memo, supra note 37, at 1.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 3.
104

Id.
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after being deported.105 Non-citizens in the second priority category
were to be removed unless "there are factors indicating the alien is not

a threat to national security, border security, or public safety, and
should not therefore be an enforcement priority."106
Priority 3 was "other immigration violations," which despite
sounding broad, was actually limited to non-citizens who had been
issued orders of removal after January 1, 2014, about ten months before
the memo was issued.107 These individuals were to be removed "unless
they qualify for asylum or another form of relief under our laws or,
unless, in the judgment of an immigration officer, the alien is not a
threat to the integrity of the immigration system or there are factors
suggesting the alien should not be an enforcement priority."108

That left most undocumented immigrants, at least those without
criminal records who had been in the United States for more than a
couple years, as non-priorities for deportation. Though the memo
stated that "[n]othing in this memorandum should be construed to
prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens

unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities
herein," it required the ICE Field Office Director to determine that the
removal of an individual not designated a priority be determined to

serve an "important federal interest" by the ICE Field Director.109
This was the first time that the immigration agencies had set a
default position of non-removability for a large category of removable
individuals. The Obama administration decided to take a categorical

approach to prosecutorial discretion, as opposed to the case-by-case
determinations that had been favored in previous administrations,
largely because of institutional pushback from immigration officials

who resented the directives not to enforce the law to the fullest extent
possible.110 The Morton Memo, which had been Obama's first attempt
to expand the use of prosecutorial discretion, had not in fact changed

105 Id. at 3-4.
106 Id. at 4.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 5.
110 Press Release, ICE Union, ICE Agent's Union Speaks Out on Director's "Discretionary
Memo": Calls On the Public to Take Action (June 23, 2011). After DACA was announced, several
immigration officers filed suit against Obama administration officials, alleging that
implementing DACA required them to violate various statutory and constitutional obligations
to enforce the immigration laws. The lawsuit was eventually dismissed for lack of standing by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015).
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policy on the ground very much.", DACA and DAPA, and to a lesser
extent the Johnson Memo, were attempts by the administration to take
discretion away from rank-and-file immigration officers who were
perhaps disinclined to exercise it.112
And indeed, prosecutorial discretion became much more
commonly exercised under the Johnson Memo than it had been
previously. After the memo was issued, interior deportations dropped
thirty-two percent the following fiscal year.1 3 Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of individuals removed were in one of the three
priority categories. In fiscal year 2015, ICE only removed sixty-seven
individuals who did not fall within a priority category but whose
removal had been determined to serve a federal interest.114 Despite the
institutional resistance to the policy, it was effective in implementing
guidelines that were being followed by individual immigration officers.
The status quo was upended once again with the election of Donald
Trump in November 2016. Trump had made immigration the
centerpiece of his campaign and had been particularly critical of the
Obama administration's use of prosecutorial discretion,115 calling for
the President's impeachment after Obama's November 2014 executive
actions.116 Shortly after his inauguration, Trump issued three executive
orders concerning immigration. One of those orders, "Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States," changed ICE's
enforcement priorities once again in a way that completely transformed
the immigration system.117 The priorities, as stated in the new executive

order, were individuals who:

111 Morton Memo, supra note 88.
112 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE L.J. 104, 193 (2015).
113 Interior removals decreased from 102,224 in fiscal year 2014 to 69,478 in fiscal year 2015,
the first year that the Johnson Memo was in effect. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015

https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/
(2015),
8
fy2015removalStats.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NSA-Z7ND].
114 Id. at 4-5.
115 Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump on 'Meet the Press,'Annotated, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2015,
11:28 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/17/donald-trump-onmeet-the-press-annotated [https://perma.cc/TZ29-Q8JU].
116 Andrew Kaczynski, Trump Once Called Executive Action on Immigration Dangerous,
Unconstitutional and Impeachable, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019, 9:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
[https://perma.cc/
02/14/politics/kfile-trump-immigration-executive-action-2014/index.html
3MZE-5Q8Z].
117 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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(a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense; (b) Have been
charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has not been
resolved; (c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable
criminal offense; (d) Have engaged in fraud or willful
misrepresentation in connection with any official matter or
application before a governmental agency; (e) Have abused any
program related to receipt of public benefits; (f) Are subject to a final
order of removal, but who have not complied with their legal
obligation to depart the United States; or (g) In the judgment of an
immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national
security.118
The executive order had the effect of prioritizing most
undocumented immigrants for removal. There were no factors to be

considered and the humanitarian element of previous prosecutorial
discretion policies was completely eliminated. It did not matter how
long an individual had been in the United States, whether they had U.S.

citizen family members, or whether they had a medical condition.
Moreover, given the fact that the priorities included individuals who
had committed the elements of a crime, even if they had not been
convicted, it allowed immigration officials to find almost any reason to
designate someone as a priority for removal. In the words of one
advocacy organization, it "expanded 'enforcement priorities' so broadly
as to render the term meaningless."119
On February 20, 2017, then-Secretary of Homeland Security John

Kelly issued a memorandum implementing the President's executive
order.120 Like the Johnson Memo, it rescinded all previous memos on
prosecutorial discretion, except for those governing DACA and

DAPA.121 It also banned the exercise of discretion "in a manner that
exempts or excludes a specified class or category of aliens from
enforcement of the immigration laws."122 Instead, under the memo,

discretion could only be exercised on a "case-by-case basis in

118

Id. at 8800.

119 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE END OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES UNDER THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 1 (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/

files/research/theendof immigrationenforcement-prioritiesunder_the_trump_
administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/8245-SGS6].
120 Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17 0220_S1_Enforcement-of-theImmigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YPY-MZBX].
121 Id. at 1-2.
122 Id. at 4.
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consultation with the head of the field office."123 The memo contained
no factors for immigration officials to consider when deciding whether
to exercise discretion. Though it technically still allowed the
immigration agencies to exercise discretion in individual cases, the
purpose of the memorandum was to seriously curtail the use of
immediately ... Department
"Effective
prosecutorial discretion:
personnel shall faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United

States against all removable aliens."124
It became clear in the months following the issuance of the
memorandum that the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration
enforcement was all but dead.125 In fiscal year 2018, the first full fiscal
year of the Trump administration, removals were up seventeen percent
from 2016.126 Many of those removals were people, like Guadalupe
Garcia de Rayos, who were checking in with ICE on old orders of
removal. But they also included people who would have been obvious
any
other
during
discretion
for prosecutorial
candidates
with
a
10-year-old
administration. The case of Rosa Maria Hernandez,
cerebral palsy who was arrested on her way to the hospital for
gallbladder surgery, illustrates the extent to which the immigration
officials have ceased exercising discretion on humanitarian grounds.127
Of course, because resources were still limited, the administration
could not deport all removable non-citizens. Instead, whether someone

123 Id.

124 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
125 Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, The Trump Administration at Six Months: A Sea Change
19,
2017),
(July
POL'Y
INST.
MIGRATION
Enforcement,
in
Immigration
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-administration-six-months-sea-changeimmigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/E4AE-TFBG]; KJ, Trump Administration Ends
ProsecutorialDiscretion? All Undocumented Immigrants Threatened With Removal?, IMMIGR.
PROF BLOG (July 8, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/07/trumpadministration-ends-prosecutorial-discretion-all-undocumented-immigrants-threatened-withremov.html [https://perma.cc/8B4M-L4P5]; Dean DeChiaro, 'Open Season' on Immigrants as
DiscretionFades, ROLL CALL (Dec. 11, 2017, 5:04 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/
open-season-on-immigrants [https://perma.cc/RRC8-P7FL].
126 John Gramlich, How Border Apprehensions, ICE Arrests and DeportationsHave Changed
Under Trump, PEw RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/
02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-trump
[https://perma.cc/HT3T-YPXM].
127 Vivian Yee & Caitlin Dickerson, 10-Year-Old ImmigrantIs DetainedAfter Agents Stop Her
on Way to Surgery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/us/girlcerebral-palsy-detained-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/K8JP-7V5L]; Am. Immigr. Council
Staff, How Discretion Failed One 10-Year-Old Girl and What the Future Holds, IMMIGR. IMPACT
http://immigrationimpact.com/2017/10/30/rosa-maria-hernandez2017),
30,
(Oct.
immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/K8JP-7V5L].
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was slated for removal depended on being in the wrong place at the
wrong time-a kind of random enforcement that is not tied to priorities
at all. In addition, because due process still requires that most noncitizens have the opportunity to fight their removal in immigration
court, the death of prosecutorial discretion simply meant an even longer

backlog of cases in immigration court. The administration's efforts to
speed up removal proceedings and clear the backlog-for instance,
through case completion quotas for immigration judges-were
unsuccessful at addressing the problem.128
The Biden administration took action immediately to resurrect
prosecutorial discretion. On January 20, 2021, Biden revoked the Kelly
memo and directed his Department of Homeland Security to issue new
directives.129 That same day, DHS issued a memorandum putting a one

hundred day pause on deportations, and naming new interim
enforcement priorities: (1) national security risk; (2) recent border
crossers; and (3) individuals convicted of aggravated felonies.130 The

deportation pause was later enjoined,131 an ominous sign for the future
of DACA, but the new enforcement priorities remain in effect. As a

result, immigration arrests have fallen sharply in the early months of
the new administration.32 With these changes, many undocumented
immigrants will be able to avoid deportation for a few more years. But
these swings in enforcement priorities obscure the fact that the laws
governing removal of non-citizens have remained largely unchanged
since 1996. Prosecutorial discretion has become the primary way that
immigration policy is made in the United States, and it is not working

very well.

128 EOIR
Performance Plan: Adjudicative Employees, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.abajournal.com/images/main images/03-30-2018_EOIR_-_PWP_Element_3_
new.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNG6-QW38]; Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of
February 2021, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/
apprepbacklog.php [https://perma.cc/W549-JZZB] (showing backlog continuing to grow
despite completion quotas).
129 Exec. Order No. 13993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021).
130 Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Troy
Miller, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (Jan.
20, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0120_enforcement-memo_
signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/M43G-2STU].
131 Texas v. United States, No. 21-cv-00003, 2021 WL 247877 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021).
132 Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Arrests Have Fallen Sharply Under Biden, ICE
Data Show, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2021, 4:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
ice-deportations-immigration-arrests/2021/03/09/af27b164-80fa-1leb-bb5a-ad9a91faa4ef_
story.html [https://perma.cc/NY2B-PXS4].
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THE PROBLEMS WITH PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS A
HUMANITARIAN TOOL

The use of prosecutorial discretion is unavoidable, morally
necessary, and legally sound, and this is no less the case in the
immigration context. And yet, the widespread reliance on prosecutorial
discretion to correct the injustices in our immigration system is not
without severe costs to the immigrant communities who are subjected
to the immigration system.
A.

Problems with ProsecutorialDiscretion Generally

The costs of prosecutorial discretion have long been recognized in
the criminal justice system, and many of these costs translate to the
immigration system as well. Prosecutors in both systems have an
enormous amount of power in deciding how to enforce the law. Absent
extreme circumstances, prosecutorial decisions are unreviewable. Thus,
when officials act according to implicit bias, take illegitimate criteria
into account, or fail to act in the interests of justice, there is very little

recourse available.
1.

Implicit Bias

When individual prosecutors make decisions about who and how
to charge, the biases of those individuals are unavoidably imported into
the decision-making process. Two of the most pernicious biases are race
and class. In her book, Arbitrary Justice, Angela Davis describes two
murders in Washington, D.C., one committed by a white college
student and the other committed by a working-class black man, where
the charging decisions came out differently:
Both cases were homicides involving a decedent with a reputation
for violence and a defendant who claimed that he acted in selfdefense. Yet the cases were prosecuted differently, with no apparent
justification for the difference in treatment. It was difficult not to
attribute McKnight's favorable treatment to his status as a white
133
student at a prestigious university.

133 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 21.
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The empirical research supports Davis's conclusion. For example,

some studies have found that prosecutors are far more likely to seek the
death penalty in the case of homicides in which the victim was white
and the perpetrator was black.134 A study of indigent defendants in San
Francisco found that black suspects are booked for seven percent more
crimes and twenty-four percent more felonies than white defendants,
controlling for other contextual factors.135 White defendants are also
offered better plea deals.136 All of these disparate effects are layered on
top of the over-policing of low-income communities of color that
contributes to more poor people of color entering the criminal justice
system to begin with. Although there are overtly racist prosecutors and
police officers, most of these disparities are caused by implicit bias that
is not easily ferreted out of the system.
These biases hold equal or greater sway in the immigration
system. 13 7 The same implicit biases that cause disparate outcomes for
defendants of color also affect decisions about which immigrants get
arrested, placed into removal proceedings, and deported. To begin with,
racial profiling in immigration enforcement is rampant, with ICE in
particular targeting Latinx immigrants in enforcement actions.138
Unlike in the criminal justice system, courts have permitted

immigration officers to use race as one factor used to establish
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest suspected
undocumented immigrants.139 Practically speaking, race or ethnicity is
often the only evidence immigration officers have before questioning
and arresting individuals for immigration violations.140 And such
134 DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. wOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 257 (1990).
135 EMILY OWENS, ERIN M. KERRISON & BERNANDO SANTOS DA SILVEIRA, EXAMINING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES AMONG INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN SAN FRANCISCO
6 (2017).

136 Carlos Berdej6, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1187, 1207-08 (2018).
137 See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
417 (2011).
138 Ryan Devereaux, Hispanic Caucus on Trump's Deportations: "We're Creating an
Immigration Police State," INTERCEPT (Feb. 15, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/
02/15/hispanic-caucus-on-trumps-deportations-were-creating-an-immigration-police-state
[https://perma.cc/V9XT-UDLC].
139 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
140 See, e.g., Adiel Kaplan & Vanessa Swales, Border Patrol Searches Have Increased on
Greyhound, Other Buses Far From Border, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2019, 4:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/border-patrol-searches-have-increased-
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Fourth Amendment violations cannot be used to stop an individual's
deportation unless he or she can show the violation was egregious.141
The same biases that give rise to racial profiling also are likely to
influence individual officers' decisions about whether to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in any particular case, regardless of whether
race or ethnicity are explicitly prohibited factors for consideration.
Moreover, the biases of the criminal justice system are replicated
in the immigration system due to the connection between criminal
convictions and deportability.142 Because people of color have higher
rates of felony convictions (despite committing crimes at similar rates
as whites), a greater percentage of immigrants of color have convictions
that make them deportable. For example, although only seven percent
of non-citizens in the United States are black, they make up twenty
percent of the non-citizens facing removal on criminal grounds.143
Disparate sentencing practices also have an effect. One study found that
black defendants receive sentences that are on average nine percent

longer than sentences of white defendants.144 Since many convictions
only become aggravated felonies with sentences of at least one year,1 45
sentence length could lead to more black non-citizens being subjected
to the harshest immigration consequences.
Many immigrants of color are vulnerable to removal even if they
have never committed a crime. Undocumented immigrants who are
arrested but never convicted may end up in ICE custody due to
programs like Secure Communities, through which ICE lodges
detainers and takes custody of individuals in local and state jails.146 The
incentives to plead guilty in the criminal system even when a person is
innocent also take a toll. Although in 2010 the Supreme Court held in
greyhound-other-buses-far-border-n1012596 [https://perma.cc/5FW7-NQWU} (border patrol
stopping to question only people of color on Greyhound bus); Andrea Castillo, 'Collateral
Arrests' By ICE Amount to Racial Profiling, Violate Immigrants'Rights, Lawyers Say, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ice-collateral-arrests20180204-story.html [https://perma.cc/SQ6H-EE87] (ICE often arrests all Latinx people first and
asks questions later in workplace raids and other enforcement actions).
141 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
142 Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate
Impacts of Crime-BasedRemovals, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REv. 993, 998 (2016).
143 JULIANA MORGAN-TROSTLE, KEXIN ZHENG & CARL LIPSCOMBE, THE STATE OF BLACK
IMMIGRANTS 40 (2016).
144 M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J.
POL. ECON. 1320, 1323-24 (2014).
145 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
146 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, https://www.ice.gov/securecommunities [https://perma.cc/CSP9-E9SQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
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Padilla v. Kentucky that defense attorneys must advise non-citizen
defendants of the immigration consequences of plea deals,147 the Court
subsequently held that its holding was not retroactive.148 As a result,
many non-citizens are removable for criminal convictions that they
pled guilty to on advice of counsel to avoid serving a lengthy sentence
at a time when their attorney had no obligation to inform them that the
conviction would lead to their deportation.
Thus, immigrants of color are affected by implicit bias in a layered,
multi-faceted way. They are victimized by over-policing, the biases of
criminal prosecutors, and the criminal justice system, like all people of

color. But they are also victimized by an immigration system that
prioritizes them for removal on the basis of their prior encounters with

the criminal justice system, 149 amplifying the effects of implicit bias. In
a system rife with implicit bias, prosecutorial discretion will always be

applied unevenly with "the least favored members of the communityracial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the poor .. . treated [the]
most harshly."150 In a system totally dependent on discretion to
function, the problem of implicit bias will inflict heavy costs on lowincome immigrants of color, ensuring that the goal of a just
immigration system remains out of reach.
2.

Illegitimate Criteria

Race and class are not the only biases that affect the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors. Prosecutors often use criteria that many
people would consider illegitimate or unrelated to the resourcemanagement or humanitarian rationales for broad use of discretion,
including the prosecutor's personal animus or beliefs and political
considerations. High-profile crimes often prompt prosecutors to seek
harsh penalties, even in cases where it would not otherwise be
warranted because of public pressure. Conversely, a high-profile

147 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
148 Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013).
149 See Johnson Memo, supra note 94; Kelly Memo, supra note 120.
150 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1555
(1981).
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suspect may not get charged at all if it would be politically
inexpedient.151
Immigration officials are likewise susceptible to using illegitimate
criteria to decide whether to arrest, initiate removal proceedings, or
execute a removal order. For example, ICE has targeted immigrants'
rights activists in enforcement actions in retaliation for engaging in
protected speech. Migrant Justice, a Vermont farmworker organization,
filed suit against ICE in 2018 alleging that the agency had targeted its
members and leaders because of its anti-immigration enforcement
activism.152 The plaintiffs dismissed the lawsuit after ICE agreed to pay
the plaintiffs $100,000 in damages and to grant them deferred action for
five years.is3
In another example, ICE arrested and attempted to execute a
removal order against Ravi Ragbir, an activist with the New Sanctuary
Coalition (NSC) in New York City, after he spoke out against President
Trump's immigration policies and made statements to the media
critical of ICE.154 Ragbir alleged in a lawsuit that an ICE official had told
a minister connected to NSC that activists "don't want to make matters
worse by saying things."155 The Second Circuit concluded in 2019 that

151 For example, the case of Bill Cosby illustrates how political considerations can cause
charging decisions to go either way, even with respect to the same suspect. Prosecutors declined
to prosecute Cosby for the 2004 sexual assault on Andrea Constand at the time of the assault.
Shannon Troetel, Prosecutors End Cosby Investigation, CNN (Feb. 22, 2005, 2:36 PM),
[https://perma.cc/FT9S-9U8W].
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/17/cosby/index.html
However, after many other women came forward to report that they had also been assaulted by
Cosby, prosecutors reversed their decision in 2015. See Noreen Malone, 'I'm No Longer Afraid':
35 Women Tell Their Stories About Being Assaulted by Bill Cosby, and the Culture That Wouldn't
Listen, N.Y. MAG. (July 26, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/07/bill-cosbys-accusers-speakout.html [https://perma.cc/57RW-NTT4]. In 2018, Cosby was convicted on three counts related
to the assault. Manual Roig-Franzia, Bill Cosby Convicted on Three Counts of Sexual Assault,
WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2018, 9:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/billcosby-convicted-on-three-counts-of-sexual-assault/2018/04/26/d740ef22-4885-11e8-827e190efaflfleestory.html [https://perma.cc/3QHL-AACM].
152 First Amended Complaint at 9-10, Migrant Justice v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-00192 (D. Vt.
Feb. 7, 2019); Jack Herrera, Is ICE Targeting Activists?, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/is-ice-targeting-activists [https://perma.cc/GTR3-Z46J].
153 Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release and Dismissal With Prejudice of All
Claims in this Action at 2-3, Migrant Justice v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-00192 (D. Vt. Oct. 28, 2020).
154 Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court later vacated the
Second Circuit judgment and remanded "in light of Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020)." Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227, 227 (2020) (internal
citations omitted).
155 Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 60.
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Ragbir had stated a cognizable First Amendment claim.156 These are just

two examples of activists who have alleged that ICE has targeted them
because of their First Amendment-protected activities. Though ICE
denies targeting anyone because of their speech, ICE's almost limitless
discretion inevitably leads to questions about how they choose to

exercise it in individual circumstances.
For non-citizens without constitutional claims, the legal options
are far more limited. The Supreme Court made clear in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that, like in the
criminal context, most selective prosecution claims in the immigration

context are unreviewable.157 In Reno, the Court concluded that
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which the
government characterized as a terrorist organization, could not bring a
selective prosecution claim.158 In explaining its decision, it reasoned that
selective prosecution claims were less compelling in the immigration

context both because deportation is not a punishment and because of
the foreign policy and national security concerns inherent in
immigration enforcement are higher than in the domestic context.159
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiamfurther complicates attempts to litigate claims

against ICE by holding that the constitutional writ of habeas corpus is
not available to litigate challenges to deportation orders.160 For most
immigrants targeted by ICE, there will be no recourse in the courts.

Conversely, public pressure has occasionally been effective at
getting ICE to reverse course and exercise discretion after initially
declining to. For example, after ICE deported Jose Gonzalez Carranza,

a widower of a soldier who had been killed in Afghanistan, the public
opprobrium was swift and unforgiving.161 ICE reversed course and
allowed him to reenter the United States four days later after Republican
Governor of Arizona, Doug Ducey, criticized the decision.162 At first,

156 Id. at 57.

157 525 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1999).
158 Id. at 488-92.
159 Id. at 490-91.
160 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963-69 (2020).
161 Tim Elfrink, ICE Deported the Spouse of a Soldier Killed in Afghanistan, Attorney Says,
WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2019, 5:08 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/04/16/
ice-deported-widow-soldier-killed-afghanistan-attorney-says [https://perma.cc/5KSV-ASUK].
162 Tara Law, ICE Deported a U.S. Veteran's Widower Before a Judge Reversed the Order, TIME
(Apr. 16, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://time.com/5571923/doug-ducey-military-spouse-deported-icearizona [https://perma.cc/PU4L-QEJP].
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this may appear to be a good use of prosecutorial discretion. But the
decision was not made based on the application of a set of factors to
Gonzalez's case. Instead, the widower was lucky enough to have a
lawyer, and even luckier to have a lawyer who knew how to leverage the
press coverage to his client's advantage. For every case like Gonzalez's,
there are ten other non-citizens without lawyers whose stories did not
garner press coverage and who were deported in obscurity despite their
positive equities.

In these cases, ICE made decisions about who to deport based
either on impermissible factors, such as political speech, or on factors
that have little to do with the merits of individuals' cases, such as the
amount of press coverage the case has garnered. A system that gives
prosecutors enormous power comes at a cost-similarly situated
individuals will be treated differently based on factors that ICE should

not consider.
3.

Institutional Design Problems

The prosecutor holds a unique position in our adversarial system.
Unlike other parties, including the lawyer representing the criminal
defendant, prosecutors have an obligation to see that justice is done. 163
They represent "the people," not themselves, and have special ethical
duties that other lawyers do not have. As the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecutor Function

puts it:
The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the
bounds of the law, not merely to convict. The prosecutor serves the
public interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment
to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal
charges of appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not
pursue criminal charges in appropriate circumstances. The
prosecutor should seek to protect the innocent and convict the
guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect
the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects
and defendants.64

163 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 144.
164 GRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTOR FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N
2017); see also MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020); Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting the prosecutor's goal "is not ...
shall be done").

[to] win a case, but that justice
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In practice, these principles are rarely upheld. Instead, prosecutors

inevitably suffer from a "prosecutor bias" that tilts the system away
from justice and towards maximum enforcement.165 As Rachel Barkow
has explained, when an institution has dueling missions, one mission
will inevitably win out.1 66 It is simply unrealistic to expect prosecutors

to act both as zealous advocates for their positions and to operate with
the best interests of justice in mind.167 This institutional conflict is seen
most clearly in cases in which new evidence casts doubt on old
convictions. Even when evidence of actual innocence is overwhelming,
prosecutors often refuse to join in motions to overturn the conviction,

choosing to double down instead of admit error. 168
The institutional design problems in the immigration system are
equally problematic, and perhaps more so. The ethical obligations of

immigration officials to "seek justice" are less clear-cut than in the
criminal context. Arguably, as government employees, they have the
same obligations as traditional law enforcement and prosecutors to be
ministers of justice, not simply zealous advocates for a particular

result.169 In practice, however, ICE operates with an ethos of maximum
enforcement, perhaps even more so than criminal prosecutors.
The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor states its mission as
"protect[ing] the homeland by diligently litigating cases," not seeking
justice.170 The mission of Enforcement and Removal Operations, the

division of ICE that is most often responsible for deciding whether to
initiate proceedings, is even more unambiguous. Its mission is "to

protect the homeland through the arrest and removal of those who
undermine the safety of our communities and the integrity of our

165 Rachel E. Barkow, ProsecutorialAdministration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of

Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 309-15 (2013).
166 Id. at 307-08.
167 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 883 (2009).
168 See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 501-03 (2009); Lara Bazelon, The Innocence
Deniers, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/innocence-deniers[https://perma.cc/JJ43prosecutors-who-have-refused-to-admit-wrongful-convictions.html
R98E].
169 Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 20-28 (2014) (arguing that ICE attorneys have the same ethical obligations as prosecutors
to be ministers of justice).
170 Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF'T,
https://www.ice.gov/opla [https://perma.cc/7GQS-T76D} (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
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immigration laws."171 Compare that to the mission statement of the
Department of Justice, which includes "to ensure fair and impartial
administration of justice" among the Department's aims.172
Forged in the aftermath of 9/11 and populated by officials with
extreme views on immigration enforcement,173 ICE's culture is perhaps
unsurprising. While some ICE officials do take seriously the
commitment to exercise discretion to achieve humanitarian goals,
many do not. For example, some immigration courts have a much
higher percentage of removal proceedings closed by ICE as an exercise
of discretion than others, ranging from 46.6 percent of all cases in the
Tucson Immigration Court, to 0 percent in many immigration court
locations.174 Not only does this lead to unjust results in individual cases,
but it leads to a system in which discretion is often exercised arbitrarily
depending on which official happens to make the decision. From a
humanitarian perspective, we should be bothered by a system in which
some officials decline to exercise discretion at all because of their
mission tilt.
President Obama attempted to solve this problem by relocating the
decision-making authority on whether to grant deferred action to
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the subagency in DHS that grants immigration benefits.175 But in the Trump
era, even USCIS has been reoriented into an enforcement agency.1 76 As
long as the power of discretion is located in the agency tasked with
enforcement, then the use of discretion to accomplish humanitarian
goals will be limited.

171 Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF'T,
https://www.ice.gov/ero [https://perma.cc/868A-WET3] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
172 About DOJ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/7DL86HGM] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
173 Cade, supra note 169, at 18-20 (detailing the creation of the agency in response to 9/11);
2018),
(Sept.
ATLANTIC
ICE,
Radicalized
Trump
Foer,
How
Franklin
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772
6GLG-S8GP] ("At various moments during [the Obama] years, a broad swath of ICE officers
behaved as a rogue unit within the federal government.").
174 Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on ProsecutorialDiscretion, TRAC IMMIGR. (July
31, 2017), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion [https://perma.cc/57C4-YGJF].
175 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 112, at 193-94.
176 Jim Acosta & Sophie Tatum, US Immigration Agency Updates Statement to No Longer Say
'Nation of 'Immigrants,' CNN (Feb. 22, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/22/
politics/uscis-mission-statement/index.html [https://perma.cc/FRA2-CCP7].
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Special Problems with Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Immigration Context

Many of the problems that plague the criminal justice system's
reliance on prosecutorial discretion apply with equal force in
immigration enforcement. But the immigration system has additional

features that make the widespread use of prosecutorial discretion even
more problematic, and less likely to accomplish the humanitarian goals

that supporters of discretion tout.
1.

System Differences

Prosecutors in the criminal justice system wield enormous power

to decide who and what to charge and whether to offer a plea. Many
scholars have written about how prosecutors abuse this power. Yet,
there are checks that exist in the criminal justice system that prevent

prosecutors from going too far. Angela Davis writes about a case
dismissed because of "prosecutorial vindictiveness," after the
prosecutor punished a criminal defendant for not acting as an
informant by charging the underage defendant as an adult.177 Davis
makes the point that judicial intervention of this type is very rare,17 8 but

the prospect, however remote, that a court will intervene puts a restraint
on prosecutorial behavior.
Those checks on prosecutorial power are absent in the
immigration context. ICE trial attorneys operate in administrative

tribunals that are "courts" in name only.17.9 Immigration courts are not
Article III courts, and they even lack some of the basic features that
many Article I courts have. Immigration judges are not administrative
law judges (ALJs) under the Administrative Procedure Act, meaning
they are not required to pass merit-based screening to be appointed and

they lack statutory protection from removal.180 What this means is that
immigration judges are at the mercy of the administration that employs

177 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 123-25.
178 Id. at 126-27.
179 Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration "Judges"and the Trappings of "Courts," 33
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 266-67 (2019).
180 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (immigration judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(1) (2021) (immigration
judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2021) (B.I.A. members); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1665 (2010); Kent Barnett, Against Administrative
Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647 (2016).
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them. If their grant rates drift too high, or if they are seen as
disadvantaging ICE in removal proceedings, then their appointment
can be non-renewed, or even terminated. Though historically the
Attorney General has not taken such actions, the mere specter can cause
immigration judges to adjust their conduct to be more government
friendly.181
The Trump administration took multiple steps in order to curtail
the independence of immigration judges in its last two years. 182 Former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued several decisions that curtailed
immigration judges' ability to manage their own docket by restricting
the ability to terminate proceedings and administratively close cases
unless ICE consents. 183 In 2018, an immigration judge was removed
from dozens of cases in the Philadelphia immigration court because he
had raised due process concerns in a case in which ICE sought a
removal order of an unaccompanied minor who had failed to appear in
court.184 The union of immigration judges filed a grievance, arguing that
the move violated the judge's "decisional independence."185
Immigration judges are supposed to exercise "independent judgment
and discretion" by regulation,186 but the reality is far different.
In March 2018, the Department of Justice announced a series of
benchmarks that immigration judges need to meet in order to receive
satisfactory job reviews.187 These included a case completion quota of
181 For a discussion of the problems with the current state of immigration adjudication, see
Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 467, 468-70 (2008);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportationand the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 37073 (2006).
182 Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV.
707, 728-37 (2019).
183 Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) (finding immigration judges may
only administratively close cases in specific, limited circumstances); Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018) (finding immigration judges have no inherent authority to
terminate proceedings absent ICE consent).
184 Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Removed From Cases After Perceived Criticism of Sessions,
CNN (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/immigration-judgesjustice-department-grievance/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y22T-EYW6].
185 Grievance Pursuant to Article 8 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between EOIR
and NAIJ from Hon. Steven A. Morley, Immigr. Judge, & Nat'l Ass'n of Immigr. Judges, to
(Aug.
8,
2018),
Judge
4
Chief
Immigr.
Santoro,
Deputy
Christopher
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4639659/NAIJ-Grievance-Morley-2018Unsigned.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTQ7-E2BX].
186 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2021).
187 EOIR Issues Guidance Implementing ImmigrationJudge PerformanceMetrics, AM. IMMIGR.
LAWS. ASS'N (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judgeperformance-metrics [https://perma.cc/Y4Y9-5LUH].
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more than 700 per year (which amounts to almost three cases per day,

assuming no vacation or sick days), as well as benchmarks regarding
how quickly individual cases are resolved.188 Though the benchmarks
do not instruct immigration judges on how the cases must be resolved,
shorter resolution times inevitably lead to a higher rate of removal
orders. For example, one of the benchmarks requires that "[i]n 95% of
all cases, individual merits hearing is completed on the initial scheduled
hearing date, unless, if applicable, DHS does not produce the alien on
the hearing date."189 Complicated claims for relief may require multiple

days of testimony; the benchmark encourages immigration courts to
deny a non-citizen's request for a second hearing day, which could lead
a meritorious claim to be denied. As one immigrants' rights
organization argued, "forcing judges to meet an arbitrary quota within

an underfunded and backlogged court system will only result in limiting
due process, curtailing judges' deliberations, and denying immigrants
adequate time to find lawyers and gather evidence."190
In 2019, the Department of Justice moved to decertify the
immigration judges' union on the ground that immigration judges were
"managers," unable to unionize.191 The Federal Labor Relations
Authority agreed, decertifying the union and leaving immigration
judges with even fewer protections against political interference. 192
Dozens of immigration judges resigned or retired "due to concerns

about their jobs becoming politicized."193 Though many of the Trump
administration's actions with respect to immigration courts were

unprecedented, the system is set up in such a way as to permit such
politicization and lack of independence. With such a system,
prosecutors do not need to fear a judge who will check their
prosecutorial power, leading to greater abuses.
The other incentives that prosecutors have in the criminal justice

system to exercise discretion are also absent in the immigration context.

188

Id.

Id.
190 Press Release, Nat'l Immigrant Just. Ctr., With New Immigration Judge Quotas, AG
(Apr. 3, 2018),
Sessions Hijacks U.S. Justice System to Hurt Immigrants
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/press-releases/new-immigration-judge-quotas-ag-sessionshijacks-us-justice-system-hurt-immigrants [https://perma.cc/A6AX-SBAD].
191 U.S. Dep't of Just., Exec. Off. for. Immigr. Rev., 71 F.L.R.A. 1046 (2020).
189

192

Id.

Rachel Frazin, Immigration Judges Say They're Leaving Jobs Because of Trump Policies,
13, 2019, 9:24 PM), https://thehill.com/latino/429940-immigration-judges-saytheyre-leaving-jobs-because-of-trump-policies [https://perma.cc/EN7A-DS3R].
193

HILL (Feb.
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There are no juries, and no possibility for jury nullification,194 which is
a rare but important consequence for a prosecutor who has abused his
or her authority.195 Prosecutors in the criminal system may be more
inclined to exercise favorable discretion when they fear jury
nullification than when they do not. 196 Unlike in many state systems,
ICE prosecutors are not elected and so do not have the democratic
accountability that such elections provide. While democratic
electability of prosecutors may cause prosecutors to avoid exercising
discretion lest they upset their voters, 197 there is no doubt that it helps
avoid the worst abuses. Prosecutors have, on occasion, been voted out
for egregious examples of misconduct, something an ICE prosecutor
does not fear.198 Only non-citizens-by definition non-voters-are
subject to the immigration system, further complicating any democratic
accountability. 199
Non-citizens in removal proceedings are not entitled to counsel at
the government expense, 200 and only about thirty-seven percent of non194 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1344-45 (2008) (exploring the lack of jury nullification in administrative
proceedings); see also Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 88 (1980) (explaining that jury nullification is an
important check in "prosecutorial practices").
195 Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2013) (explaining approximately four percent of cases end with
jury nullification).
196 Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 296-300 (1996).
197 See, e.g., Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C. McCannon, The Effect of the Election of
Prosecutorson Criminal Trials, 161 PUB. CHOICE 141, 142 (2014).
198 See, e.g., Joaquin Sapien, For Brooklyn Prosecutor, a Troubled Last Term, and a Trail of
Lingering Questions, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2013, 11:16 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/for-brooklyn-prosecutor-a-troubled-last-term-and-a-trail-of-lingering-quest
[https://perma.cc/7A93-UUBJ].
199 Johnson, supra note 142, at 996 (discussing democratic accountability problems in systems
of non-voters such as immigrants).
200 8 U.S.C. § 1362; Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Because
immigration proceedings are of a civil rather than criminal nature, aliens in removal proceedings
'enjoy[ ] no specific right to counsel' under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution." (quoting
Zheng v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005))); Lopez-Vega v. Holder, 336 F. App'x
622, 626 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have never extended a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to immigration proceedings."); Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir.
2004) ("It is well-settled that, while there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, aliens have a
statutory right to counsel at their own expense . ... ") (citation omitted); Uspango v. Ashcroft,
289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation
hearings .... "); Mustata v. U.S. Dep't. of Just., 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is
clear that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil deportation proceedings."); Castaneda-
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citizens in removal proceedings have counsel as a result.201 This means
that even non-citizens who might be good candidates for prosecutorial
discretion are unlikely to be able to navigate the system to request and
obtain it. Prosecutors know that given the complexity of immigration
law, unrepresented non-citizens are going to be unlikely to be able to

fight their removal effectively, which removes one of the primary
incentives that prosecutors have in the criminal system to exercise
discretion. Indeed, eighty-three percent of non-detained non-citizens
without attorneys are ordered removed versus forty percent who have
counsel.202

Likewise, the burden of proof in immigration cases is much lower
than the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard mandated by the Sixth
Amendment.203 In many cases, the non-citizen has the burden of proof.
For example, once the government proves alienage,204 the non-citizen
must prove that they are present pursuant to a lawful admission,205 or if
not, that they are eligible for some form of relief from deportation.206
For most undocumented immigrants, for whom proving alienage is not
onerous, this means that burden of proof rests entirely with them and
not the government. Even in cases where ICE bears the burden of proof,
for instance in proving that a lawful permanent resident was convicted

of a deportable offense, the burden-which is "clear and convincing
evidence," not "beyond a reasonable doubt"-is easily met with court
documents.207 The burden then shifts to the non-citizen to prove
eligibility for relief.

Suarez v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 993 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Deportation
hearings are deemed civil proceedings and thus aliens have no constitutional right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment."); Lozada v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("Because deportation proceedings are deemed to be civil, rather than criminal, in
nature, petitioners have no constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.").
201 INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 2 (2016),

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/access-tocounsel_
in_immigration-court.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4L2-LBMF].
202 Id. at 19.
203 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) ("[I]t has long been assumed that proof of a
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.").
204 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2021) ("In the case of a respondent charged as being in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, the Service must first establish the alienage of the
respondent.").
205 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2).
206 § 1229a(c)(4).
207 § 1229a(c)(3)(A)-(B).
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Neither do the other protections of the Sixth Amendment apply,
despite the fact that deportation is often a greater punishment than
what is at risk in many criminal trials.209 Thus, for example, evidentiary
rules are relaxed in removal proceedings,210 and the government often
uses affidavits that contain anonymous allegations to prove
removability grounds related to gang membership or terrorism.211
Unlike in the criminal context, ICE rarely declines to initiate
proceedings because it is worried about meeting its burden of proof.212
Instead, ICE has every incentive to initiate proceedings.
All of these features mean that ICE has none of the incentives to
exercise discretion that exist in the criminal system. There is nothing
about the system that tempers the ethos of maximum enforcement
discussed above. In such a system, it is unsurprising that prosecutorial
discretion has failed to mitigate the harshest aspects of our immigration
system.
208

208 Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[S]ince deportation and
removal proceedings are civil, they are 'not subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards
accompanying criminal trials .... ' (quoting Magallanes-Damian v. Immigr. and Naturalization
Serv., 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986))); Montilla v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 926 F.2d
162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Because a deportation proceeding is civil, not criminal, in nature,
various constitutional protections are not required.").
209 See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-CriminalDivide: A BifurcatedApproach
to Understandingthe Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
289 (2008).
210 Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("The Federal Rules
of Evidence . .. do not apply in immigration hearings. Rather, [t]he sole test for admission of
evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair.") (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); Solis v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 832, 835-36 (8th Cir. 2008)
("[T]raditional rules of evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings.").
211 PAIGE AUSTIN, JP PERRY, IRMA SOLIS & CAMILLE MACKLER, STUCK WITH SUSPICION: HOW
VAGUE GANG ALLEGATIONS IMPACT RELIEF & BOND FOR IMMIGRANT NEW YORKERS 14 (2019),

https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field-documents/020819-nyclu-nyic-report.pdf
("DHS documents memorializing allegations of gang
[https://perma.cc/47NK-4KUB]
affiliation-including memoranda authored by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and I213s-typically mention the respondent's attire, tattoos, associations or alleged self-admission,
or unnamed third parties' accusations. But, these documents lack even basic details about when,
where, or in what context the suspicious incidents occurred. This makes the allegations very
difficult to effectively refute.").
212 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS, supra note 164, at § 3-4.3(a) ("A prosecutor should seek or file
criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by
probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice."); Cade, supra note
169, at 34-39 (outlining incentives for ICE attorneys to file weak claims of removability).
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Legal Differences

The use of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context to

accomplish humanitarian goals is further complicated by two features
of immigration law that distinguish it from criminal law. As discussed
above, the immigration laws are written in such a way that the majority

of non-citizens could be removed for one reason or another. In this way,
the immigration and criminal laws are similar-criminal justice
scholars have long noted that the proliferation of federal and state
criminal statutes means that we are all violating the law all the time
without even realizing it.213 For example, certain loitering laws have
long been criticized, and occasionally struck down, as allowing for the
arrest of almost anyone in public.214 Likewise, traffic rules can provide

police with a pretext to pull over almost anyone they want. 215
Immigration laws are similar in that they regulate a wide range of
conduct and even simple clerical errors can render a non-citizen
deportable. A motivated ICE official can find a pretext upon which to
initiate proceedings for all but the most law-abiding individuals.
However, immigration law is different in two key respects. First,

immigration violations are continuing violations and there is no statute
of limitations on their applicability. A non-citizen without status is
without status every second of every day in perpetuity unless they gain
status in some way, or they are removed. A non-citizen convicted of a

crime thirty years ago remains removable today, despite the passage of
time. A person engaging in criminal activity is most worried about
getting caught while engaged in the activity and shortly afterwards. A
removable non-citizen can be arrested at any time and placed in
removal proceedings for conduct that occurred half a lifetime ago.
There has been much criticism of the term "illegal" to describe
undocumented immigrants as dehumanizing and othering.216 But it is
213 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 13.

214 Andrew D. Leipold, TargetedLoitering Laws, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 474, 480 (2001); City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (striking down Chicago anti-loitering ordinance as void
for vagueness).
215 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-19 (1996) (finding police can stop and detain
for even minor traffic violations, regardless of the officer's true intent).
216 Emily C. Torstveit Ngara, Aliens, Aggravated Felons, and Worse: When Words Breed Fear
and Fear Breeds Injustice, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 389, 417-19 (2016); Keith CunninghamParmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1575-76 (2011); Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration
Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263,
276-77 (1997).
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accurate in one respect: our immigration laws declare that the person's
mere existence is unlawful, something that cannot be said for most
other legal violations.
Second, all grounds of removability lead to the same outcome
regardless of the severity of the conduct that gives rise to it.217 Thus, a
non-citizen convicted of murder is subject to the same consequence as
a lawful permanent resident who does not carry their green card with
them at all times: removal. This is very different from the criminal

context where prosecutorial discretion can be exercised not only in
whether to charge someone, but also in how much time they will serve,
either in the decision on what to charge or in a plea agreement. Except
in the most egregious criminal conduct, a life sentence is not possible.
Many people get convicted of minor crimes and are sentenced to
community service or probation. There is no equivalent in the
immigration context.
There are a few caveats to this second point. First, there is a type of
relief called "voluntary departure," that some might view as a type of
plea bargain. Voluntary departure allows a removable non-citizen to
leave the country voluntarily and avoid a removal order, which allows
them to avoid some of the bars to reentry that attach to a removal
order.218 But if the primary consequence is separation from family and
community, it hardly matters that the person was free to leave on their
own.
Those bars to reentry represent another type of difference in the
length of the "sentence" imposed. Individuals who have been removed
from the United States face anywhere from a five-year bar to a lifetime
bar on reentry, depending on the grounds of removability.219 Thus, an
undocumented immigrant might have a five-year or ten-year bar,
depending on how long they were present in the United States
unlawfully, whereas a person convicted of an aggravated felony is
barred for life.220 However, the bars do not give people the right to
reentry after the specified period of time. Instead, they merely remove
a barrier. Most undocumented immigrants will not be eligible to reenter
regardless of the bar. A non-citizen removed on criminal grounds will

217 Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009)
("Proportionality is conspicuously absent from the legal framework for immigration sanctions.
One sanction-deportation-is the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation.").
218 8 U.S.C. § 1229c; Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
voluntary departure allows non-citizens to avoid bars to future relief).
219 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
220 Id.
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in all likelihood be found inadmissible because of that past criminal
conduct and will be unable to return. 221 Thus, while the differences in
the length of bars appears to represent a difference in the length of a

"sentence," in reality it is nothing of the sort. The harsh reality is that
most people who are deported will never be permitted to return

legally.222
The third type of "plea bargaining" that happens occasionally in
the immigration context is when ICE consents to the grant of relief (e.g.,
asylum or cancellation of removal). While this type of discretion cannot
be dismissed, it also represents a kind of binary choice-either ICE
consents to the grant of relief in their discretion or it does not. There is
no possibility of a reduced sentence, probation, or some other
equivalent to the range of choices that are available in the criminal
context.

Within this landscape, deferred action has emerged as a kind of a
middle path for ICE officials who want to exercise discretion, equivalent
to the role a plea bargain would play in the criminal justice system. It
provides a non-citizen with temporary permission to stay in the

country, as well as permission to work in certain circumstances. But it
does not lead to a green card or citizenship and can be revoked at any
time. The person remains removable.223 In some ways, this solves the
twin dilemmas of using prosecutorial discretion in the immigration
context: the fact that removal is the only consequence available for
committing an immigration violation and the fact that a non-citizen

who is removable often remains removable for life.
However, it comes with its own set of costs. Mainly, that the

discretion is always revocable. Once a non-citizen enters the
enforcement and removal system, they are never done with it. Noncitizens who receive this kind of discretion must live a kind of
temporary existence, knowing that at any point, for any reason, that
discretion can be revoked.224 Many of the most heart-breaking stories in

221 Most crimes that will render a non-citizen deportable will also render them inadmissible
on subsequent reentries. Id.; § 1182(a)(2).
222 Of course, many of those deported return illegally, which merely complicates their legal
situation by adding possible exposure to federal felony charges. 8 U.S.C. § 1326; see also
Immigration Convictions for April 2019, TRAC IMMIGR. (May 31, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyapr19/gui [https://perma.cc/WHQ2-5244].
223 See Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2019)
(discussing the benefits and exclusions for individuals granted deferred action).
224 For a discussion of this type of temporary "non-status," see Geoffrey Heeren, The Status
of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1174-76 (2015).
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the Trump era are stories in which such discretion was revoked, none
more sensationally than with DACA.

C.

Case Study: DACA

DACA presents an interesting case study for exploring whether
prosecutorial discretion can be used to accomplish humanitarian goals
in the immigration context because it was created in part to address the
problems with previous discretion policies. DACA was the result of
years of advocacy by immigration advocates to sidestep Congress's
inaction on immigration and agency resistance to aggressive uses of
discretion.225 The program was trumpeted by supporters and DACA
recipients themselves as a successful public policy that had improved
the lives of the hundreds of thousands of young people who applied and
were granted deferred action under the program. 226
It was designed in such a way as to avoid some of the problems that
come with using prosecutorial discretion to accomplish humanitarian
goals. DACA addressed concerns about bias and inconsistency by
making the process more rule-bound than before.227 In lieu of factors to
consider or priority categories, DACA set forth seven requirements. A
person was eligible to apply if they: (1) were under thirty-one years of
age as of June 15, 2012; (2) came to the United States while under the
age of sixteen; (3) continuously resided in the United States from June

225 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 112, at 138-39, 169; Remarks by the President, supra note 91,
at 801 ("In the absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken immigration
system, what we've tried to do is focus our immigration enforcement resources in the right
places."); Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind
PresidentObama's ImmigrationActions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 671 (2016) ("President Obama's
immigration policies represent a strategy by which the elected Chief Executive and the head of
an agency seek to thwart resistance from their policies by subordinate public employees.");
Arulanantham, supra note 89.
226 Roberto G. Gonzales, Here's How DACA Changed the Lives of Young Immigrants,
According to Research, Vox (Feb. 16, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/2017/9/2/16244380/
daca-benefits-trump-undocumented-immigrants-jobs [https://perma.cc/BS5L-BHXN]; Tom K.
Wong, Greisa Martinez Rosas, Adam Luna, Henry Manning, Adrian Reyna, Patrick O'Shea, Tom
Jawetz & Philip E. Wolgin, DACA Recipients'Economic andEducationalGains Continue to Grow,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 28, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/news/2017/08/28/437956/daca-recipients-economic-educational-gains-continuegrow [https://perma.cc/5WCR-TK9L]; Brian Latimer, What Successful Young Immigrants
Want Trump to Know, NBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2016, 6:04 PM),
#WithDACA
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/withdaca-dreamers-share-stories-financial-successafter-daca-n682601 [https://perma.cc/W5W4-V2UD}.
227 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 112, at 177-80.
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15, 2007 to the present; (4) entered the United States without inspection
before or their lawful immigration status expired as of June 15, 2012;

(5) were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012 and at
the time of making the request for consideration of deferred action with
USCIS; (6) were currently in school, graduated from high school,
obtained a GED, or honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or
armed forces; and (7) had not been convicted of a felony offense, a
significant misdemeanor, or more than three misdemeanors and did
not pose a threat to national security or public safety.228 Although DHS
retained discretion to deny applications for deferred action in

individual cases even when these criteria were met, the vast majority of
applications were granted.
DACA also addressed institutional resistance by moving
adjudication of discretion requests from frontline ICE enforcement
officials to USCIS.229 USCIS traditionally has not had a role in
immigration enforcement, and thus, moving the process to USCIS

allowed a somewhat more "neutral" adjudicator to decide whether to
grant deferred action. In this way, DACA was very successful. While the
2011 Morton Memo had little effect on grants of prosecutorial
discretion, approximately 800,000 people applied and were granted
DACA in the first five years of the program.2 30
Yet, the program was unable to solve some of the challenges of
using prosecutorial discretion as a humanitarian tool in the
immigration context. The main problem continued to be that DACA
provided only temporary status that could be revoked at any time.
Because lack of legal status is a continuing violation, DACA did not and
could not provide any type of permanent relief. It was, as Lindsay Perez

Huber has described it, an "'illusion of freedom' that provide [s] limited
opportunities, yet, continue[s] to exclude undocumented youth from

228 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov
/xlibrary/assets/s 1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-aschildren.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLD8-A3E2].
229 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 112, at 193-95.
230 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., NUMBER OF FORM I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS
AND CASE STATUS FISCAL YEAR 2012-2017 (SEPTEMBER 30) (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites

/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%
20Data/AIl%20Form%2OTypes/DACA/dacaperformancedatafy2017 qtr4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LP9X-7G4D].
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full participation in American society."231 Moreover, the institutional
resistance to DACA and broad discretion policies more generally did
not disappear; it just went underground, waiting for a more receptive
administration in which to reassert itself.
Shortly after Trump's inauguration, it became clear that the
"illusion of freedom" was gone. In February 2017, Daniel Ramirez
became one of the first DACA recipients to be arrested under Trump
after ICE accused him of having a gang affiliation.232 A month later,
Daniela Vargas, a DACA recipient and immigrants' rights advocate,
was arrested after speaking at a rally.233 The fear that all DACA
recipients were at risk was confirmed when on September 5, 2017, the
Trump administration announced that it was rescinding the
program. 234 Court challenges quickly enjoined the rescission of the
program, and DACA recipients waited anxiously for the Supreme Court
to weigh in.235
In June 2020, the Supreme Court decided Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California,which held
that the Trump administration's attempt to end DACA was unlawful
under the Administrative Procedure Act.236 However, the decision did
very little to resolve the question of DACA's legality. Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, reaffirmed that "[a]ll parties agree" that DHS
can end DACA and the only question before the Court was whether it
231 Lindsay Perez Huber, "Como Una JaulaDe Oro" (It's Like A Golden Cage): The Impact of
DACA and the California Dream Act on Undocumented Chicanas/Latinas, 33 CHICANA/OLATINA/O L. REv. 91, 94 (2015).
232 Dara Lind, DanielRamirez Medina: What We Know About the DREAMer Trump Is Trying
to Deport, Vox (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/15/
14622346/daniel-ramirez-medina-daca-arrest-ice [https://perma.cc/3B6S-R9UT].
233 Christine Hauser, Woman Detained After Speaking About DeportationFears Is Released,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/us/daniela-vargas-detaineddaca-released.html [https://perma.cc/YPS6-93QJ].
234 Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1 (Sept. 5, 2017); see also Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. et al.
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
(Sept.
5,
[https://perma.cc/DU88-P5RV].
235 Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev'd in part by Dep't of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Nat'l Ass'n for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C.), adhered to on denial of
reconsideration,315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018), granting stay in part, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143
(D.D.C. 2018); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir.
2018), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 140 S. Ct. 1891; Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 924 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2019).
236 140 S. Ct. 1891.
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did so in a lawful manner. 237 On this question, the Court held that DHS
had failed to consider whether the different parts of DACA could be
disentangled and did not take into account the reliance interests of
DACA recipients.238 It thus struck down the rescission as arbitrary and
capricious, while giving the administration a roadmap if it wanted to
try again.239

Justice Roberts was careful not to decide the question of DACA's
legality, but his opinion suggests an answer anyway. If the entire
program was unlawful, it would not matter whether DHS considered
whether to disentangle the decision not to initiate removal proceedings

from the decision to provide DACA recipients work authorization and
other benefits. Yet, if the entire program was lawful, then terminating it
because it was unlawful would clearly not pass muster under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The only conclusion to draw is that
Roberts believes that part of DACA is unlawful. Given his recitation of
the clearly established principle that the executive can decline to initiate
proceedings24o and the Court's equally divided decision upholding the
injunction striking down DAPA's work authorization provision,241 it

seems clear which part of DACA may be held unlawful in the future.
DACA has now been reinstated by Biden.242 Yet, the last four years

have exposed two major problems with DACA-like programs. First, the
aspects of DACA that distinguished it from previous discretion
policies-namely that it provided a level of security and access to work
authorization that previous policies lacked-may be challenged and
eventually struck down. It is this part of DACA that has allowed DACA

recipients to go to school, have careers, access state and federal benefits,
and start families. Second, as the Supreme Court made clear, a future
administration may decide to end such programs at any time as long as
they abide by the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The legal and political uncertainty surrounding DACA is
devastating. In a study of undocumented youth before DACA, Roberto
Gonzales found that their unlawful status "took a serious toll on their
health, well-being, and future outlooks."243 Those harms, partially

237 Id. at 1905.
238 Id. at 1911-15.
239 Id. at 1910.
240 Id. at 1911.
241 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam).

242 Memorandum, supra note 21.
243 ROBERTO G. GONZALES, LIVES IN LIMBO: UNDOCUMENTED AND COMING OF AGE IN
AMERICA xx (2016).
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mitigated after DACA went into effect, have returned. As one DACA
recipient tweeted: "MY DACA WAS RENEWED! This means 2 more
yrs of living/working/driving without the constant fear of deportation.
It also means 2 more yrs of soul crushing anxiety + stress as my future,
and that of 700K #DACA recipients, remains uncertain .... "244 Indeed,
many DACA-eligible individuals never applied, citing fear that
applying would expose them or their families to immigration

enforcement.245

244 Juan Escalante (@JuanSaaa), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://twitter.com/
JuanSaaa/status/1118598191824494595 [https://perma.cc/TL2T-8CWJ].
245 Cinday Carcamo, Half of Eligible Immigrants Sign Up for Deferred DeportationProgram,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ff-deferreddeportation-20130813-story.html [https://perma.cc/KE3V-NUKB].
246 Remarks by the President, supra note 91, at 801.
247 The conventional wisdom was bolstered by the well-studied endowment effect in
economics and behavioral psychology, which theorizes that because of institutionalization and
loss-aversion, it is much easier to refuse to grant something of value than it is to take it away. See
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 691 (2011); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193,
194-96 (1991).

;
,

DACA was always a poor substitute for legislative reform. When it
was announced, President Obama made clear that he preferred that
Congress act to pass the DREAM Act, stating that "[p]recisely because
[DACA] is temporary, Congress needs to act. There is still time for
Congress to pass the DREAM Act this year, because these kids deserve
to plan their lives in more than two-year increments."246 Still, the
conventional wisdom was that while DACA was technically temporary,
future administrations-even conservative ones-would pay a heavy
political cost for ending the program. 247 That conventional wisdom has
proven false.
Moreover, the political capital that Obama expended on DACA
was not without costs, particularly in the field of immigration. DACA
at once polarized the immigration debate and also relieved whatever
political pressure there was to pass the DREAM Act. It is, of course,
uncertain what would have happened had Obama declined to take
executive action to solve the problem of undocumented youth. Perhaps
nothing would have happened, leaving undocumented youth without
even the short-term protection that DACA provided. But moving
forward, future administrations will need to decide where to spend their
political capital on immigration. Likewise, advocates will need to make
strategic decisions about where to focus their organizing energy.
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DACA unquestionably had positive effects,248 and few DACA
recipients would say that it would have been better for the program to

have never existed at all. Still, DACA has exposed the severe limitations
of using prosecutorial discretion to solve the problems in our
immigration system. Even a program that was designed in order to solve

the problems inherent in previous prosecutorial discretion regimes was
unable to overcome some of the fundamental problems with using
discretion in place of legislative reform to accomplish humanitarian

goals. And future DACA-like programs may be even less effective
because of legal constraints caused by future court decisions.
III.

TOWARDS A BETTER PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION SYSTEM

Given the failure of prosecutorial discretion to inject humanity
into our immigration system, legislative reforms remain a priority.

Many immigration scholars have identified "over-removability" as a
problem in the current immigration system. Some have written about
the need to revise the criminal grounds of deportability to decrease the
number of minor crimes that might render a non-citizen deportable, or
even get rid of the criminal grounds of deportability altogether. For
example, Kari Hong has argued that criminal grounds of removability

are "[o]verinclusive, [d]isproportionate, [i]rrational, [i]nefficient, and
[e]xpensive" and should be abolished.249 Other scholars have written
about ways to more explicitly incorporate a balancing of the equities in
removability, which would essentially turn a plea for discretion into a

legal claim. For instance, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has argued that
prosecutorial discretion should be codified in regulations and subjected
to judicial review.25o Michael Wishnie takes another tack by reading into
the Immigration and Nationality Act, by way of the Due Process Clause,
a requirement that a sanction (deportation) should be proportional to
the offense.25i This "proportionality" claim would allow immigration

judges and federal courts to weigh the equities in the cases of individual

248 See, e.g., Roberto G. Gonzales, Veronica Terriquez & Stephen Ruszczyk, Becoming
DACAmented: Assessing the Short-Term Benefits of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), 58 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1852 (2014).
249 Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation,50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2130
(2017).
250 Wadhia, supra note 10, at 286-99.
251 Michael J. Wishnie, ImmigrationLaw and the ProportionalityRequirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 415, 416-18 (2012).
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immigrants. Still others have called for an expanded form of
cancellation of removal that would allow more non-citizens with
positive equities to qualify for relief.252 Comprehensive immigration
reform proposals usually include some form of amnesty for
undocumented immigrants without criminal records who have been
here for a certain length of time.253 A few scholars have even gone as far
as calling for an end to deportation altogether.254
These are all proposals worthy of consideration, but they suffer
from several problems. First, some of them fall into the "pie in the sky"
category of proposals that are unlikely to be enacted in our lifetimes.
Abolishing the criminal grounds of deportability, for example, seems
about as likely as the author of this Article winning an Olympic medalit could conceivably happen, but the confluence of events that would be
necessary to make it so are so attenuated that no one should bet on it.
Some of the proposals seem more likely, but are still remote. Courts
could step in and hold that deportation is subject to proportionality
under the Due Process Clause, but early litigation has not thus far been
particularly promising.255 An amnesty as part of comprehensive
immigration reform is possible, but like past amnesties, it would
provide a one-time solution to the problem. And while Congress may
step in and expand forms of relief to mitigate the need for prosecutorial
discretion, the prospects of such reform seem tenuous at best.256
Furthermore, any expanded form of relief would undoubtedly still
exclude individuals worthy of discretion. Absent a true end to all
deportations, prosecutorial discretion will remain an important feature
of any system-an enforcement system without it would be as unjust as
it would be unworkable.
Absent broad legislative reform, there may be ways to tweak the
immigration laws and system to allow it to function more like the
criminal justice system when it comes to prosecutorial discretion. The
criminal justice system is, quite obviously, not perfect. But the
immigration system is even less so, and bringing it more in line with

252 Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1675 (2009) ("To
enable immigration judges and the BIA to make ... individualized determinations, the Attorney
General would need greater authority to grant cancellation of removal, similar to the INA section
212(c) regime.").
253 See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of
2013, S. 744, § 2101-04 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
254 Angdlica Chdzaro, The End of Deportation, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
255 See, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 270 (1st Cir. 2015).
256 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 538.
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what already exists in the criminal context would make prosecutorial
discretion both function better and be less vital to producing just

outcomes. These changes fall into two major categories: (1) reforming
both the limits and consequences of removability to more effectively
mirror criminal liability, and (2) redesigning the immigration
adjudicatory system to more closely resemble the criminal justice
system with respect to institutional checks and individual rights.
A.

Statute of Limitationsfor Removability Grounds

One way to reform the immigration system to more closely mirror
the criminal justice system would be to implement a statute of

limitations for removability grounds.257 A statute of limitations would
bring immigration law more in line with other criminal and civil
statutes. Civil immigration violations are almost unique in not having a

statute of limitations. All but the most serious crimes (such as murder
and treason) have a statute of limitations, as do civil regimes that

impose fines or other penalties.258 Putting a limit on how long the
government has from when a non-citizen becomes removable, because
of a criminal conviction, entering without inspection, or overstaying a
visa, would both encourage the government to remove non-citizens

quickly and solve the problem of non-citizens being removed decades
after becoming removable. It would also limit the length of time noncitizens could remain in limbo after being granted prosecutorial
discretion, creating an endpoint after which the fear and threat of
deportation would cease. Individuals like Guadalupe Garcia de Rayos

would not have to live in fear indefinitely.
Though a statute of limitations may seem like a remarkable
proposition given the current legal regime and political climate, one
existed for the first seventy years of U.S. immigration enforcement. In

1888, when Congress passed the first statute that provided for
deportation of non-citizens who fell into certain categories, it limited

257 See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: CrimmigrationLaw and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1705, 1745-47 (2011) (proposing a statute of limitations for criminal grounds of
inadmissibility).
258 For an overview of the history and development of statutes of limitations in American legal
history, see Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
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deportation to one year following entry into the country. 259 That
limitations period was gradually expanded from one year to three
years 260 to five years, 261 before being abolished completely in the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).262
Vestiges of time limitations still exist in the current law. For
example, a little-known provision of the INA allows individuals who
have been physically present since January 1, 1972, to register for a
green card despite any unlawful presence they have accrued.263 The date
for "registry" as it is called was updated multiple times in the twentieth
century, but has not been updated since the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986.264 Cancellation of removal also has a time
limitation built into it-requiring lawful permanent residents to have
resided in the United States for seven years and all other non-citizens
to have resided in the United States for ten years before being eligible
to apply,265 although these provisions function less like a statute of
limitations and more like a substantive requirement because of the
other onerous requirements non-citizens have to meet in order to
qualify. Finally, there is precedent for the criminal grounds of
removability to have a statute of limitations of sorts. A single crime
involving moral turpitude, one of the categories of crimes that renders
an individual deportable, does not render an individual deportable
unless it occurred within five years of initial entry. 266
Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim has written about how the historical
justifications for statutes of limitations apply with equal force in the
immigration context.267 The first reason typically advanced for statutes
of limitations is the idea that "at some point in time, even highly
culpable defendants deserve to be free of civil or criminal liability."268

259 Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566 (repealed). The Act "authorize[d] the Secretary
of the Treasury, in case he shall be satisfied that an immigrant has been allowed to land contrary
to the prohibition of that law, to cause such immigrant within the period of one year after landing
or entry, to be taken into custody and returned to the country from whence he came .... " See
also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 96 (1903).
260 Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, ch. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 898, 904-05.
261 Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 877, 889.
262 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 167 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.).
263 8 U.S.C. § 1259(a).
264 Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3361, § 203(a).
265 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
266 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
267 See generally Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Deportation Deadline, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 531
(2017).
268 Id. at 543.
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This justification is what has animated past amnesty programs for

undocumented immigrants who have been here for a certain number of
years, such as the 1986 legalization program that resulted in 2.7 million

gaining legal status. 269 It also accords with the public discourse that has
developed around the Trump administration's aggressive enforcement

actions against individuals with old removal orders. There is something
particularly troubling about someone facing deportation for events that
occurred decades ago. This justification is perhaps even stronger when
talking about individuals who are removable because of old criminal
convictions because they have already been convicted and have paid
their debt to society.
Statutes of limitations are superior to prosecutorial discretion at
producing humanitarian outcomes in multiple respects. For one,
statutes of limitations do not depend on fickle or biased decisionmakers to grant mercy in particular cases. For another, they are absolute
and not subject to future reconsideration if circumstances change.
The second justification Kim discusses-the costs of uncertainty
to those at risk for future prosecution270-is even more important in the
immigration context than in many of the civil and criminal contexts in
which statutes of limitations are taken for granted. The consequences

of deportation can be extremely dire-permanent banishment from
community, permanent separation from friends and loved ones, entire
lives destroyed. A person facing civil or criminal liability in other
contexts may fear serious consequences, but they are rarely as life-

altering as those suffered by someone facing deportation. As discussed
above, the uncertainty of existing in a liminal immigration status such
as deferred action, or in living life in the shadows, cannot be dismissed
lightly.271

It is unclear how this proposal would affect the million or so
individuals who already have removal orders, given that statutes of
limitations typically only apply to the initiation of proceedings. But

there is some precedent for the idea that there should be a limit on how
long a legal obligation should hang over someone's head, even after the

269 Emily Badger, What Happened to the Millions of Immigrants Granted Legal Status Under
Ronald Reagan?, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2014/ 11/26/what-happened-to-the-millions-of-immigrants-granted-legal-status-underronald-reagan [https://perma.cc/Q8MW-LXNN].
270 Kim, supra note 267, at 547-48.
271 See supra Section II.C.
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conclusion of proceedings. For example, civil judgments can typically
only be collected for a certain number of years. 272
One possible critique of a statute of limitations in the immigration
context is that it would encourage non-citizens to avoid capture by law
enforcement, and that it would reward non-citizens who can
successfully evade discovery. This critique, of course, is equally valid in
all cases in which there is a statute of limitations. Individuals who have
committed criminal or other civil offenses likewise have an incentive to
avoid discovery until after the statute of limitations has run. Moreover,
non-citizens who fear deportation already have such incentives in the
current system and are unlikely to act any differently because there may
be a light at the end of the tunnel.
A statute of limitations based on discovery of a removability
ground rather than the accrual of that ground would, of course, solve
this problem. So, a statute would begin to run when an individual who
crossed the border without inspection was discovered to be in the
country unlawfully rather than on the date they crossed the border.273
This is currently how federal law treats the crimes of improper entry
and illegal reentry. 274 However, a discovery-based limitation would also
fail to provide many of the benefits that an accrual-based limitation
would. It would provide no certainty for the millions of removable noncitizens who have not encountered the immigration enforcement
system. Nor would it allow mercy in some of the most deserving cases
of individuals who have lived long, productive lives in the United States
before being caught.
It is also worth considering whether a statute of limitations would
create incentives for government actors that would undercut these
justifications. One could argue that rather than making the
prosecutorial discretion system work better, a statute of limitations may
have the opposite effect. For example, a statute of limitations on
removability grounds may discourage the government from granting
deferred action because the option of later removing an individual may
be foreclosed. But there may be advantages to a system in which the
government must prioritize whom to remove lest they lose the right to
remove them at all. The government simply cannot deport everyone,

272 For example, judgments obtained under federal law are valid for twenty years. 28 U.S.C.

§ 3201(c).
273 Kim, supra note 267, at 577.
274 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3282; United States v. Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d
504, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bencomo-Castillo, 176 F.3d 1300, 1303 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996).
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and a statute of limitations would require them to focus on recent
arrivals, who are less likely to have the kinds of positive equities that
would counsel in favor of discretion anyway. After a brief adjustment
period, where the government may be moved to quickly remove
individuals who are nearing the statute of limitations, the system would
function better overall. Moreover, other reforms, such as expanding the
available penalties for civil immigration violations, reforms discussed
below, may ameliorate this concern by giving the government other

options besides removing someone or letting them go entirely.
B.

Expand Available Penaltiesfor Civil Immigration Violations

As discussed above, unlike in most other civil and criminal
enforcement regimes, there are essentially only two outcomes in
removal proceedings. Either relief is granted and proceedings are
terminated, or an individual is ordered removed.275 The result is the
same whether the individual was convicted of serious crimes such as
murder or terrorism, or whether they committed a technical violation
like failing to file the correct form in a timely matter. 276 The black-and-

white nature of deportation increases the importance of prosecutorial
discretion to avoid unjust outcomes. It also decreases the options

available for an official who wants to exercise discretion but does not
want to completely absolve the individual of culpability for the past
immigration violation. There is no equivalent to a reduced sentence,
probation, or diversionary programs that are commonplace in the
criminal justice system. 277

Giving the government other options besides removal for
enforcing our immigration laws would decrease reliance on deferred
action and other current forms of discretion and would allow ICE
officials to exercise discretion in more durable ways. What other
options are possible? It could be a fine-based system, which would allow
non-citizens to avoid removal and instead pay a fine to the government

275 See supra Section II.B.2.
276 This disproportionality is the basis of Michael Wishnie's argument that the removal system
currently violates the Due Process Clause. Wishnie, supra note 251, at 416-17.
277 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 5 (discussing prosecutor's power of charging and plea
bargaining).
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to violate the law.278 Non-citizens could agree to serve in the military or
could be sentenced to a certain number of hours of public service.
Similar to sentences of incarceration, non-citizens could be ordered
removed for a certain amount of time, before being allowed to apply to
reenter at the conclusion of the sentence, similar to the current bars to
reentry but with a promise of reentry at the end.
There may be objections to all of these outcomes. Fine-based
systems disadvantage the poor. Service-related sentences are difficult
for individuals with onerous work or family obligations to fulfill. There
is the question about what would happen if individuals given lesser
sentences cannot or do not comply with the requirements of the
sentence. Removal, even temporary removal, would be a hardship on
individuals, families, and communities. But all of these sentences would
be preferable for many facing permanent and irrevocable removal in the
current system.
The main objection to such a proposal would undoubtedly be that
it ignores the foundational principle underlying the modern
immigration enforcement regime, which is that control over a nation's
borders is an issue of national security and sovereignty, and that
deportation is not a punishment, but a process by which the
government exercises its right to determine who can remain in the
country. The Supreme Court established this principle early in the
nation's experiment with deporting non-citizens in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States in 1893.279 In that case, the Court explained that "[t]he
right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely
or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential
to its safety, its independence, and its welfare."280 As a result, it held that
"'[d]eportation' is the removal of an alien out of the country, simply
because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and
without any punishment being imposed or contemplated."281
The understanding of deportation as an exercise of sovereignty
rather than a system of punishment has held for more than one hundred
years, despite the change in immigration enforcement from an

278 The idea of using fees or fines to penalize previous immigration violations is not new.
Recent immigration reform proposals have included similar provisions. See, e.g., Border Security,
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744, 113th Cong.
§ 2101-04 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
279 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893).
280 Id. at 711.
281 Id. at 709.
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administrative system operating at ports of entry to a vast law
enforcement regime that incarcerates almost 500,000 non-citizens a
year, 28 2 costs almost $25 billion per year in federal funding to operate, 2s 3

and employs 50,000 immigration enforcement officers24-more than
the total number of people (including support staff) working for the

FBI. 285 There have been a few cracks in the designation of deportation
as nonpunitive-for instance, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court recognized deportation as a collateral consequence of criminal

convictions,

holding that "deportation

is a particularly

severe

'penalty."'286 Many scholars have called for deportation to be reclassified
as a criminal process so that the Sixth Amendment's procedural

protections would attach.287
However, expanding the penalties available for violations of civil
immigration laws would not require such a drastic change in the

understanding of what deportation is and why it exists. Indeed, any
such proposal would surely still include the right of the government to

remove individuals permanently when they are declared public safety
threats to the United States. It would merely recognize that deportation
does not need to be the only penalty for every civil immigration
violation, and that the national security and sovereignty interests of the

United States can continue to be protected in a system that allows some
deserving individuals to escape deportation by "pleading" or being
"sentenced" to a lesser penalty.
There are questions that would need to be answered in order to
implement this proposal. For instance, for an individual who received a

"lesser" sentence than removal, would that sentence then come with
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work authorization, permanent status, and a path to citizenship at its
conclusion, or would an individual continue to live a contingent, if
slightly more secure, existence? There would surely be questions about
who would be deserving of removal in this new context. Hard questions
would remain about how to implement lesser penalties, particularly for
non-citizens suffering from physical, mental, or financial limitations.
Yet, moving away from a black-and-white system of punishment would
open up these possibilities for the first time, and would allow us to
actually address the question of what should be the penalty for
committing a civil immigration violation.

C.

Redesigned Immigration Adjudication

Another way to improve the functioning of the prosecutorial
discretion system is to design the immigration adjudication system so
that it provides a true check on executive enforcement power. Two
features of the criminal justice system that could be imported into the
immigration system are the right to assigned counsel at the
government's expense and an independent immigration court that
operates separately from the political branches of government. These
reforms would not only increase the integrity of the immigration system
more generally, but would also lead to a more sensible use of
prosecutorial discretion by immigration officers.288 These reforms,
together with the changes to the limits and consequences of
removability discussed above, would go far in reforming the
prosecutorial discretion system to function more like discretion in other
contexts.
Courts have consistently held that non-citizens do not have a
289
Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in removal cases.
Although several courts of appeals have opined that the Due Process
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Mantell v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 798 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986).

1822

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:5

Clause could occasionally require the appointment of counsel,290 courts
engaging in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test have for the most

part concluded that the burden on the government would be too great
to require appointed counsel in all removal proceedings. Courts have
even failed to find a right to appointed counsel in the case of particularly
vulnerable non-citizens such as children,291 though one district court

did find that mentally incompetent individuals in removal proceedings
have a due process right to appointed counsel under the Rehabilitation
Act.292 Some states and localities have moved to implement "civil
Gideon" programs for some non-citizens in removal proceedings, but

those programs have been enacted legislatively, not through the
courts. 2 9 3

Nevertheless, expanding access to counsel for non-citizens in
removal proceedings would have several benefits on the functioning of
the system as a whole. First, represented non-citizens are much more
likely to win their cases because the avenues for relief currently available

are so complicated that most non-citizens only have a realistic
possibility of winning with counse.294 Second, because represented

citizens are more likely to win, ICE prosecutors and immigration
officials would be encouraged to exercise prosecutorial discretion in

meritorious cases, either by declining to initiate proceedings, or by
utilizing some of the alternative penalties discussed above.

290 See Michelson v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990);
Escobar Ruiz v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986); AguileraEnriquez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975); Barthold v. U.S.
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 517 F.2d 689, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1975).
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(2019) (detailing civil Gideon efforts in New York, as well as New Jersey, Chicago, and
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Similarly, an independent immigration court would not only
increase the legitimacy of the immigration system as a whole, but it
would encourage better use of prosecutorial discretion. Like in the case
of access to counsel, many scholars have proposed reforms to the
immigration courts. Some have proposed that Congress should create
an Article I court, similar to U.S. bankruptcy courts and U.S. tax
courts. 295 Others have gone so far as to propose that removal hearings
should be conducted by Article III courts.296 Both proposals stem from
the widespread belief that the immigration courts as they are currently
constituted are beholden to political forces, crippled by overwhelming
caseloads, and lacking in procedural safeguards for non-citizens.
Making immigration courts more independent would allow
prosecutorial discretion to function better by providing a true check on
prosecutorial overreach and encouraging executive branch officials to
utilize discretion to avoid losses in the courts. This would be especially
so if immigration courts were given the authority to levy penalties that
fell short of permanent removal, or to terminate proceedings for
prosecutorial misconduct. Facing a court that may disagree that a
particular individual deserved permanent banishment would encourage
officials to exercise discretion before reaching the conclusion of
proceedings. Like prosecutors who are not sure that a jury will buy their
case, immigration officials will need to make calculations about which
cases to bring, or risk losing their reputations in front of independent
judges. Moreover, independent judges could slap down egregious
prosecutorial misconduct by terminating proceedings in rare cases. Like
in the criminal context, this would not have to happen very often to
have a real effect on prosecutorial behavior.
CONCLUSION

Prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement is here to
stay. Even with legislative reforms, it will remain an important part of a
just and humane enforcement regime. Yet, the focus on getting the
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volume_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQC8-YNX4]; Christine Lockhart Poarch, The FBA's Proposal
for the Creation of a Federal Immigration Court, 61 FED. LAW. 10 (2014); Leonard Birdsong,
Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United States: Why Is There No Will to Make It an Article
I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 21 (2013).
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executive to exercise more and more discretion has largely failed to
account for the ways that prosecutorial discretion fails to mitigate

unjust outcomes. The best hopes for discretion-based relief-DACA
and DAPA-are not the panacea they once appeared to be. And future
legal developments may render DACA-like programs incapable of

accomplishing the goals its supporters set out to accomplish. If
discretion is going to remain a major feature of our immigration policy,

we must focus on reforming the system so that discretion works better.
Immigrants' rights advocates should be careful about advocating for
more discretion in the absence of these structural reforms.
The solutions proposed here may be unsatisfying to some who are
pessimistic about the prospect of any legislative reform whatsoever. It
may be, however, that some of these reforms would appeal to legislators
who are not keen on granting affirmative relief to a large number of

individuals in one fell swoop, but who might be open to certain
structural reforms that would make the system fairer. Moreover, the
alternative-a system overly reliant on discretion that is exercised in an
inconsistent, arbitrary, and biased way-is simply not viable. Reformers
should work to design a system in which prosecutorial discretion works
to advance justice, rather than the opposite.

